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ABSTRACT
Kidney Paired Donation (KPD) is a public health initiative wherein kidney
transplant candidates with willing but incompatible donors are pooled together
with the goal of finding transplant opportunities through the exchange of donors.
Transplants are completed either via exchange cycles among incompatible
donor-candidate pairs, or by transplant chains initiated by altruistic donors not
associated with any particular candidate. Selection of cycles and chains in a KPD
program has been modeled as a constrained optimization problem over a directed
network, where each vertex represents either a donor-candidate pair or an altruistic
donor, and each edge represents a potential transplant between a donor and
candidate, weighted by utility (Roth et al., 2007). The goal is to select the disjoint
set of cycles and chains that maximize the total utility among the selected
transplants. Our aim in this dissertation is to develop and expand existing methods
to optimize KPD programs, to generalize concepts and address current realities in
KPD management, and to validate these methods through simulation.
In the first project, we consider the issues of uncertainty in transplant viability
after selection and recourse to fallback options in cases of non-viability. We extend
the standard KPD model to select more general subgraphs of the KPD network,
where fallback options consisting of successful sub-cycles and sub-chains can be
realized. Methods for determining the appropriate expected utility under
uncertainty to assign to such subgraphs are established, through exact calculation
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as well as by estimation using Monte Carlo sampling. Simulations of KPD
programs are performed, demonstrating a substantial advantage in selecting such
subgraphs, in terms of realized utility, compared to the standard KPD model.
In the second project, we generalize the previous formulation to account for
candidates joining a KPD program with more than one incompatible donor,
introducing additional potential transplant opportunities and fallback options in
cases of non-viability. Such KPD models have been sparsely considered in the
literature. In this setting, edge properties depend on the specific donor involved,
and there exists the possibility of more than one directed edge between two
vertices, with implications on the expected utility calculation. We also present a
state-transition model for donor and candidate availability within KPD. Through
simulation, we demonstrate the benefits of our generalized formulation, not only for
individual candidates but for the KPD program as a whole.
In the third project, we investigate temporal aspects of KPD programs, with
candidates and donors joining and departing over time, along with matches being
confirmed or rejected. We consider modeling the KPD as a 3-dimensional tensor,
and decompose the tensor to uncover latent factors within the KPD that allow pairs
to be clustered based on their propensity to match with other pairs. This cluster
assignment can be used to inform allocation systems, allowing for greater balance
between utility and equity. We briefly overview alternative techniques to model the
dynamics of KPD programs.
We introduce our software application, which renders an interactive virtual KPD
network and incorporates methods developed in this dissertation for research and
clinical use. Finally, we outline current realities in KPD management that have yet




1.1 Kidney Paired Donation
For patients with end-stage renal disease, obtaining a kidney transplant is
preferable to remaining on dialysis, in terms of both survival and quality of life
(Evans et al., 1985; Tamura et al., 2018). While patients in the United States are
waitlisted for deceased donor kidney transplantation, there are currently over
95,000 people on this list, with 30,000-40,000 patients being added and only about
15,000 patients receiving a kidney annually (Organ Procurement and
Transplantation Network).
Patients with a willing living donor – typically a spouse, relative, or friend – may
proceed immediately with transplantation, avoiding a potentially long wait to be
allocated a deceased donor kidney. While this represents a viable option for many
patients, it is not uncommon for a transplant candidate to be found incompatible
with his or her intended donor. This can occur due to blood type incompatibility, or
if the immune system of the candidate is sensitized against certain human leukocyte
antigens (HLA) of the donor. In these situations, the transplant cannot proceed
(Segev et al., 2005b). We refer here to such patients and their donors as incompatible
donor-candidate pairs, or “pairs” for short.
1
While a direct transplant may not be viable for a given donor-candidate pair, it
is not difficult to imagine other pairs sharing the same predicament. Suppose there
exists a second pair, where the donor is compatible with the transplant candidate
of the first pair, and the donor of the first pair is compatible with the candidate of
the second. Then a simple exchange of the donors allows each candidate to receive a
transplant, thus overcoming each of their own biological incompatibilities for mutual
benefit. This exchange is illustrated in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1: Illustration of a typical donor exchange in kidney paired donation. Transplant
candidate C1 is incompatible with their donor D1, as is candidate C2 with their donor D2. Since
D2 is compatible with C1, and D1 is compatible with C2, a simple swap of the donors allows both
candidates to receive a transplant.
This idea inspires a system where new transplant opportunities are facilitated by
the exchange of donors within a collection of incompatible donor-candidate pairs.
This system is referred to as Kidney Paired Donation (KPD). A KPD program,
also known as paired kidney exchange program, donor exchange program, or kidney
exchange program, consists of a pool of pairs, each comprised of a candidate in
need of a kidney transplant along with his or her incompatible donor (or donors).
Altruistic donors not associated with any specific candidate, otherwise known as
“non-directed donors” (NDD) in the KPD literature, can also participate in KPD
programs. KPD is feasible due to the favorable outcomes for living kidney donors, as
well as the survival advantage and cost-savings for transplant candidates compared
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to continued dialysis (Laupacis et al., 1996; Irwin et al., 2012; Axelrod et al., 2018).
According to the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, roughly 500-700
transplants have come from KPD programs in the United States annually since 2012,
with the figure rising steadily over time.
1.1.1 Brief History
KPD was first proposed by Rapaport (1986), where it was envisioned that two
potential recipients with willing but incompatible donors could solve their respective
dilemmas by exchanging donors. The first implementation of this idea took place
in South Korea (Park et al., 1999). Kidney exchange has since been undertaken
in several countries, such as the Netherlands, Canada, the United Kingdom, and
Australia, among others (de Klerk et al., 2005; Keizer et al., 2005; Malik and Cole,
2014; Ferrari et al., 2015).
In the United States, under the National Organ Transplantation Act (NOTA),
it is illegal for a human to transfer an organ for “valuable consideration”. While
there had been questions as to whether KPD constituted such valuable consideration,
federal legislation explicitly exempting KPD from NOTA was passed in 2007 (Gentry
et al., 2011). While most countries operate under a single national KPD registry, in
the United States, hospital centers either operate their own programs individually
or participate in consortia or networks of KPD programs, possibly concurrently.
Examples of such consortia include the National Kidney Registry (NKR) and the
Alliance for Paired Donation (APD) (Anderson et al., 2015b; Flechner et al., 2018).
For more information on the history of KPD, the differences in KPD programs
across countries, and clinical results from KPD programs, we refer the reader to
more comprehensive work on the topic (Montgomery et al., 2005; Wallis et al., 2011;
Bingaman et al., 2012; Mierzejewska et al., 2013; Ferrari et al., 2015; Fumo et al.,
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2015; Toews et al., 2017). Additional information on the fundamental aspects and
limitations of KPD can be found in (Gentry et al., 2011).
1.1.2 Transplant Mechanisms - Cycles and Chains
We describe here two mechanisms to realize transplants in KPD. In each of
these mechanisms, transplants are arranged so that the candidate in each pair is
matched with a donor who is expected to be immunologically compatible based on
an assessment of certain characteristics, namely the blood type combination and
the sensitivity of the candidate to donor HLA. Preferences of the donors,
candidates and transplant centers involved are also considered when determining
potential transplants. This preliminary assessment of compatibility is referred to as
the virtual crossmatch.
In an exchange cycle of size `, or `-way exchange, the donor from one pair donates
to the candidate in the next pair along the cycle, with the final `-th donor closing
the cycle by donating to the original candidate. The simple donor swap in Figure
1.1 is an example of a cycle of size 2, or 2-way exchange. Figure 1.2 illustrates an
example of a cycle of size 3, or 3-way exchange.
Figure 1.2: Example of an exchange cycle of size 3 involving three incompatible donor-candidate
pairs.
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In cycles, there is the practical limitation that all transplants must be performed
simultaneously in order to avoid the possibility of a scheduled donor reneging on
their commitment after their candidate has received their transplant. Without this
restriction, the possibility exists that a donor will have donated a kidney without
their candidate having obtained a transplant. For this reason, if any one of the
transplants in a proposed cycle are later found to be unsuitable for transplantation,
none of the selected transplants in the cycle can proceed. Thus, cycles are often
limited in size, typically to 2 or 3 pairs, due to the logistics involved in practice.
A transplant chain of length ` in KPD is initiated by a NDD, who voluntarily
donates to a candidate in the pool. The donor associated with the transplanted
candidate goes on to donate to another candidate in the pool, whose donor donates
to another candidate, and so on for a total of ` transplants (Roth et al., 2006). See
Figure 1.3 for an example of a transplant chain of length 2. Matching a NDD to an
incompatible pair in KPD, as opposed to direct allocation to a transplant candidate
on the deceased donor waitlist, effectively multiplies the gift of the donor by allowing
more than one patient to obtain a transplant (Gentry et al., 2009).
Figure 1.3: Example of a transplant chain of length 2 involving a NDD and two incompatible
donor-candidate pairs.
Two strategies for including NDDs in KPD programs have been previously
described in the literature. In Domino Paired Donation (DPD), a short transplant
chain involving one or two incompatible pairs, generally transplanted
simultaneously, ends with the final donation to a candidate on the deceased donor
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waitlist (Montgomery et al., 2006). In Non-simultaneous Extended Altruistic
Donation (NEAD), chains extend as the final donor from each chain segment is
retained as a bridge donor, who are eligible to continue the chain at a later time
(Rees et al., 2009). For example, in Figure 1.3, the final donor D2 can act as a
bridge donor and initiate additional chain transplants sometime in the future. The
merits and pitfalls of each strategy are explored in Gentry et al. (2009). In this
dissertation, we will generally focus on chains arranged via the NEAD strategy.
There are several advantages to chains in comparison to cycles. First, each donor
in a chain can donate to any other compatible transplant candidate in the pool,
without requiring a reciprocal match back to an original candidate (Melcher et al.,
2013b). Also, transplant chains can be performed non-simultaneously, as donors
donate only after their paired candidate has received their transplant (Rees et al.,
2009; Dickerson et al., 2016). Thus, while having a donor renege on their commitment
in the middle of a chain would be unfortunate, it would not irreparably harm the
remaining pairs in the chain, as no donor will have donated without their paired
candidate having first received their transplant (Cowan et al., 2017). In the NKR
experience, many donors remain motivated to donate, in some cases months after
their paired candidate received their transplant (Melcher et al., 2012). Several studies
have explored ethical issues with respect to non-directed donation, including the risk
of donors reneging on their commitment, as well as whether such chains disadvantage
candidates, notably those with O blood type, on the deceased donor waitlist (Adams
et al., 2002; Sharif, 2013; Wall et al., 2017).
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1.2 Mathematical Formulation of Kidney Paired Donation
The overarching goal in KPD is to select the most desirable set of kidney exchanges
to evaluate for transplantation among the many possible alternatives at any given
time. Note that each pair or NDD can participate in at most one cycle or chain,
as each individual donor can only donate one kidney. Traditionally, a KPD pool is
managed through a sequence of regularly scheduled evaluations, referred to as match
runs, wherein the pool is assessed and a solution consisting of cycles and chains is
determined. Match run schedules vary by program, with match runs taking place
roughly every 3-4 months in some national programs to daily match runs in smaller
centers (Ferrari et al., 2015). Even in modestly-sized pools, there will typically be a
number of overlapping cycles and chains, and consequently many possible solutions.
The preferred solution would ideally be determined by pre-specified objectives,
such as maximizing the total number of transplants achieved. More generally,
matches between donors and candidates can each be assigned a utility, representing
the clinical value of the associated transplant relative to others, should it be
realized. The preferred solution would then maximize the total utility of the
selected transplants. Typically, each match is weighted equally, effectively with a
value of 1, representing the one potential transplant associated with the match.
Alternatively, transplant centers have developed scoring systems to give precedence
to certain matches, such as those involving highly-sensitized, pediatric, or medically
urgent candidates, or to preserve blood type O donors for blood type O recipients
(Melcher et al., 2013a).
The KPD problem has been modeled and analyzed under a variety of settings
(Roth et al., 2004, 2005b; Segev et al., 2005a). In this dissertation, we focus primarily
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on the novel integer linear programming formulation proposed initially by Roth et al.
(2007). This formulation allows one to easily model a number of variations on the
objective, and to add additional constraints to the problem.
The KPD pool is modeled as a directed graph G = (V,E). Here, V = V P ∪ V A
denotes the set of vertices, which in this setting comprise the set of incompatible
donor-candidate pairs, V P , and the set of NDDs, V A (where A stands for
“altruistic”). The edge set, representing matches, or potential transplants based on
the results of virtual crossmatches, is given by:
E = {(i, j) : i ∈ V, j ∈ V P , i 6= j,
successful virtual crossmatch from donor of i to candidate of j}.
(1.1)
An exchange cycle c = (Vc, Ec) of size ` can then be defined as a subgraph of G,
such that Vc = {i1, i2, . . . , i`}, where i1, i2, . . . , i` ∈ V P , and Ec = {(ik, ik+1) : k =
1, 2, . . . , `−1}∪(i`, i1) ⊆ E. A chain c′ = (Vc′ , Ec′) of length ` can be similarly defined
as a subgraph of G, such that Vc′ = {i0, i1, i2, . . . , i`}, where i0 ∈ VA, i1, i2, . . . , i` ∈
V P , and Ec = {(ik, ik+1) : k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , ` − 1} ⊆ E. We will also use the
following notation occasionally, which follows from the previous formulation. We
indicate a cycle of size ` by the ordered `-tuple c = 〈i1, . . . , i`〉, i1, i2, . . . , i` ∈ V P ,
which indicates that the donor of pair ik matches with the candidate of pair ik+1
for k = 1, . . . , `− 1, and the donor of pair i` matches with the candidate of pair i1.
Similarly a chain of length ` is denoted by the ordered (`+1)-tuple c′ = 〈i0, i1, . . . , i`〉,
i0 ∈ V A, i1, i2, . . . , i` ∈ V P , where NDD i0 matches with the candidate of pair i1,
and the donor of pair ik matches with the candidate of pair ik+1 for k = 1, . . . , `− 1.
For edge e = (i, j) ∈ E, let ue ≡ uij ∈ R+ be the utility associated with the
transplant between the donor of i and the candidate of j. The total utility of cycle
c = (Vc, Ec) is given by the sum of its constituent edge utilities, such that Uc =
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∑
e∈Ec ue. The utility of a potential solution C
∗ is then simply the sum of the
utilities of its constituent cycles, i.e.
∑
c∈C∗ Uc. Let C be the set of cycles under
consideration. For each i ∈ V , let C(i) denote the set of cycles in C that involve pair
i, i.e. C(i) = {c ∈ C : i ∈ Vc}. Let Yc = 1(cycle c selected for transplantation). The
problem of selecting the maximum utility cycle solution, the preferred solution for









Yc ≤ 1,∀ i ∈ V,
Yc ∈ {0, 1} ,∀ c ∈ C.
(1.2)
Note that chains can be handled effectively in the same manner as exchange
cycles in the standard model (1.2) by including implicit “back-edges” from every
pair in the pool back to each NDD, thus converting the chain into an artificial
cycle. See Figure 1.4 for an illustrative diagram. Based on this property, we will
sometimes use the term “cycles” in this dissertation to refer to both exchanges cycles
and transplant chains, though we will make clear when these should be considered
together or separately.
Figure 1.4: Example of a chain of length 3 consisting of a NDD, in black, and three pairs represented
by vertices labeled X, Y , and Z. The dashed arrows represent back-edges. Three artificial cycles
are effectively induced in this chain using the back-edge formulation.
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Figure 1.5 depicts a typical solution within a KPD network. The maximum utility
cycle formulation can be solved in polynomial time when the cycle size is restricted to
2, as the problem reduces to a maximum weight matching problem on an undirected
graph (Abraham et al., 2007). There also exists an edge formulation, which can
be solved in polynomial time when there are no constraints on the cycle size, by
reducing to a maximum weighted perfect matching problem on a bipartite graph. If,
however, cycles are capped at some length L, where L is an integer greater than 2
but less than the number of participating pairs, this IP problem is NP-hard (Roth
et al., 2007). Thus, while it has been shown that it is preferable to admit both 2-
and 3-way exchanges (such that L = 3) in KPD over 2-way exchanges alone (such
that L = 2), even this case may be computationally burdensome (Saidman et al.,
2006). Practically, solutions for such IP problems can be obtained with the aid of
optimization software, such as CPLEX or Gurobi, for pools of modest size. In this
dissertation, we use Gurobi exclusively for optimization (Gurobi Optimization Inc.).
1.3 Objectives
This dissertation is a spiritual successor to that of Li (2012), developing and
expanding on ideas initially presented there. In this dissertation, we establish and
propose significant improvements to methods and algorithms that account for the
inherent uncertainty in KPD and allow for fallback options in the cases of
non-viability, address several current issues that are of clinical importance to KPD,
such as candidates joining with more than one donor and difficult-to-match pairs
accumulating in KPD pools over time, and demonstrate our improvements using
simulations and visual software.
This dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter II, we propose to account
10
Figure 1.5: Example of a KPD network, consisting of incompatible donor-candidate pairs as
vertices and matches between donors and candidates as edges, with a solution centered and
highlighted.
for uncertainty in transplant viability, as well as for fallback options in cases of
such uncertainty, culminating in a divide-and-conquer approach focusing on dense
subgraphs of the KPD network. In Chapter III, we extend and generalize the KPD
formulation to account for pairs joining KPD with more than one incompatible
donor. In Chapter IV we model the temporal aspects of a KPD program via a
3-dimensional tensor, and attempt to uncover latent features of the underlying
network over time through tensor decomposition, with the goal of achieving a
greater balance between utility and equity in transplantation. We present our
software application implementing elements of this dissertation in Chapter V, and
conclude with a discussion of additional issues in KPD in Chapter VI.
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CHAPTER II
Uncertainty and Fallback Options in Kidney Paired
Donation
2.1 Introduction
The formulation presented in Section 1.2 to select the optimal set of disjoint chains
and cycles assumes all selected transplants will proceed to transplantation without
issue. In reality, there is non-negligible uncertainty in every step of a KPD program,
and there exists the possibility, should certain exchanges be found non-viable, that
selected cycles and chains may have to be abandoned or shortened. By accounting
for this uncertainty, we can instead attempt to select exchanges that are the most
likely to lead to successful transplants, and that allow for immediate recourse to
fallback options in cases of non-viability.
2.1.1 Uncertainty in Transplant Viability
Candidate sensitivity to foreign HLA is a major barrier to successful kidney
transplantation, with many patients having pre-formed sensitivities to certain
donor antigens (Mierzejewska et al., 2013; Zecher et al., 2018). In first-time
transplant recipients, such sensitization arises as a result of pregnancies, blood
transfusions, and pathogen exposure. In repeated transplant recipients,
sensitization occurs due to previous graft exposure (Velidedeoglu et al., 2018).
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Initially, matches between donors and candidates that are expected to be
biologically compatible are determined by virtual crossmatch based on the blood
type combination, known information on candidate sensitivities to donor HLA, and
preferences of the donors, candidates and transplant centers. However,
comprehensive compatibility testing, where antibodies against a specific donor are
detected by incubating candidate serum with donor lymphocytes, can uncover
incompatibilities that had not been previously detected. This laboratory
crossmatch must take place before a donor and candidate proceed to
transplantation, in order to confirm the viability of the transplant. In other words,
though a virtual crossmatch is negative, indicating a presumed viable transplant,
the result can be overturned if a clinically relevant HLA mismatch is revealed in a
positive laboratory crossmatch (Johnson et al., 2016). Failure to proceed with an
exchange can also occur if a candidate or transplant center declines the proposed
donor, or if a selected donor or candidate must withdraw from the pool, for
example due to illness, either temporarily or permanently (Fumo et al., 2015). Note
that when we use the term “failure” in this context, we are referring to the failure
of a selected donor, candidate, or match proceeding to transplantation, not to
kidney graft failure.
The discovery of additional candidate sensitivities, or other situations where
selected pairs cannot proceed with transplantation, means that one can realistically
expect only a fraction of patients among the selected exchanges to receive the
kidney they were originally allocated (Dickerson et al., 2013). If a proposed
transplant were found to be non-viable within a cycle, none of the transplants in
the cycle would be able to proceed, as that would require a donor to undergo
transplantation without their paired candidate receiving their promised transplant.
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Similarly, chains cannot advance to completion as initially determined, though it
may be administratively permissible for transplantation to proceed up to the point
of failure, as no donor will have donated without their candidate first receiving a
transplant (Montgomery et al., 2006; Roth et al., 2006; Rees et al., 2009).
Several studies have proposed to move away from the deterministic model of KPD
to a model incorporating stochastic elements, where the operational uncertainty in
arranging kidney exchanges is addressed by considering the probabilities that selected
exchanges are found to be non-viable prior to transplantation (Chen et al., 2012;
Dickerson et al., 2013; Li et al., 2014b; Pedroso, 2014). In Li (2012), each match is
assigned a probability corresponding to the chance that the match is proven viable.
For e ∈ E, let Xe represent the Bernouilli random variable describing the event the
match is truly viable, and let pe = P (Xe = 1). The probability an exchange cycle
c is viable is therefore given by Pc ≡
∏
e∈Ec pe. Note that it is assumed that match
failures are independent. The expected utility of the cycle is therefore given by
EUc ≡ PcUc, and the total expected utility of the solution C∗ is given by
∑
c∈C∗ EUc.
By substituting EUc for Uc in (1.2), the problem becomes one of maximizing the
expected utility among disjoint cycles and chains, as opposed to the (presumed)
utility.
2.1.2 Fallback Options for Non-Viable Exchanges
One concern when dealing with the uncertainty inherent in KPD is the
re-allocation of pairs and NDDs when planned exchanges fail. In the case of such a
failure, there may be an opportunity for immediate recourse to alternative
transplant options. In particular, within a chosen cycle or chain, one can
immediately consider for transplantation any sub-cycle or sub-chain that remains
viable once failures in the originally selected cycle or chain are determined (Li,
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2012; Li et al., 2014b).
An example of a fallback option in a 3-way exchange is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
In Figure 2.1(a), we observe three pairs forming a cycle, from pair A to B to C and
back, with an additional match identified from the donor of pair B to the candidate
of pair A. If the match between the donor of pair B and the candidate of pair C
were to be overturned based on the results of a laboratory crossmatch, as illustrated
in Figure 2.1(b), or if either the donor or candidate in pair C were to withdraw after
selection or the match between the donor of pair C and the candidate of pair A were
to be overturned, one would still be able to revert to the 2-way exchange between
pairs A and B as a fallback option.
Figure 2.1: Example of (a) a 3-way exchange between pairs A, B, and C, and (b) a fallback option
to a 2-way exchange between pairs A and B in the event of failure.
Strategies that include fallback options operate under the assumption that after
confirming availability of donors and candidates, as well as the viability of all matches
within the original cycle or chain, one would proceed to transplantation with the
optimal set of remaining sub-cycles and sub-chains. Previous studies have considered
contingency planning early in the selection stage, though mostly restricted to simple
cycles (Li et al., 2014b; Klimentova et al., 2016; Alvelos et al., 2016). Their work
motivates our contributions here.
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2.1.3 Outline
We consider a KPD program consisting of both donor-candidate pairs and NDDs,
and propose separating the sources of failure in the matches from those pertaining to
the pairs or NDDs. We also identify a more general class of transplant arrangements
that allows for additional fallback options to be considered during optimization. We
then describe methods to assign an appropriate expected utility value to each such
arrangement. Simulations demonstrate the superiority of our approach in a realistic
dynamic model of KPD.
2.2 Adapting Kidney Paired Donation to Account for Uncertainty and
Fallback Options
Following Section 1.2, we represent the pairs and NDDs and the matches between
them as a directed graph G = (V,E), with vertex set V = V P ∪ V A comprising the
set of donor-candidate pairs, V P , and the set of NDDs, V A. The edge set is again
given by (1.1).
As noted, there is an important element of uncertainty in a KPD program in that
a selected exchange may not lead to a completed transplant due to the unavailability
of the donor or the candidate, or because presumed compatibility is overturned by
a laboratory crossmatch. Let qi ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability that both the donor
and candidate of pair i ∈ V P are available through to transplantation. Similarly,
for NDDs, let qi denote the probability that NDD i ∈ V A remain available. For
e = (i, j) ∈ E, let pe ≡ pij ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability of the match proving to
be viable for transplantation. We assume that the success or failure of any given
pair or NDD is independent of the success or failure of any other pair or NDD, and
that match failures, conditional on the availability of the pairs or NDD involved, are
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independent of each other as well.
Finally, we let the utility of e = (i, j) ∈ E be given by ue ≡ uij ∈ R+, as
before. While it is common to assume a default utility of 1 for all matches, such that
all potential transplants are valued equally, a more general utility assignment can
account for various factors that would increase the priority of a transplant, such as
the amount of time the matched candidate has been waiting in the KPD program,
for example.
2.2.1 Locally Relevant Subgraphs
Recall that in the formulation described in Section 1.2, cycles and chains are
represented as subgraphs of the original KPD network G. In general, any transplant
arrangement of interest can be represented as a subgraph S = (VS, ES) of G such that
VS = V
P
S ∪ V AS ⊆ V , where V PS ⊆ V P , V AS ⊆ V A, and ES ⊆ {(i, j) ∈ E | i, j ∈ VS}.
The arguments in this section are applicable to any class of transplant arrangements,
including the class of cycles and chains, which simply restricts the edge sets to include
only those matches directly involved in the cycle or chain.
Here, we describe a class of transplant arrangements that extend beyond simple
cycles and chains, allowing for additional fallback options in cases of donor,
candidate, or match failure. Wang et al. (2018) characterize the subgraphs of
interest, based on an idea proposed by Li (2012) to identify strongly connected
components of the underlying KPD compatibility graph. For fixed integer values of
x, y, and L, where max (x, y) ≤ L, we consider subgraphs S of size |VS| ≤ L, where
each vertex is involved in at least one sub-cycle of size at most x, or at least one
sub-chain of length at most y. In addition, we require vertices within these
subgraphs to be connected in such a way that any partition of the vertex set into
two non-empty parts will result in the loss of at least one sub-cycle of size at most
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x or sub-chain of length at most y. We refer to these subgraphs as Locally Relevant
Subgraphs (LRS), and denote the class of all such subgraphs of G as
LRS(G;x, y, L).
The idea behind the LRS is that for a KPD network, it is easier to evaluate many
smaller subgraphs in a divide-and-conquer manner than the single large network as
a whole. A LRS consists of a size-restricted set of overlapping sub-cycles and sub-
chains, allowing for additional fallback options to be considered after selection. As
detailed earlier, we operate under the assumption that by selecting a LRS to evaluate
for transplantation, once the availability of donors and candidates and viability of
matches are confirmed, one would proceed to transplantation with the optimal set
of remaining sub-cycles and sub-chains.
Figure 2.2: Example of a LRS of size 6 made up of two NDDs V A = {1, 2} (in black), and four
incompatible donor-candidate pairs V P = {3, 4, 5, 6} (in white).
As an illustration, Figure 2.2 depicts an example of a LRS of size 6 made up of
two NDDs, V AS = {1, 2}, represented by black vertices, and four incompatible
donor-candidate pairs, V PS = {3, 4, 5, 6}, represented by white vertices. The LRS is
denoted S = (VS, ES), where VS = V
A
S ∪ V PS = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, and
ES = {(1, 6), (2, 3), (2, 4), (3, 4), (4, 5), (4, 6), (5, 4)}. Letting x = 3 and y = 3, we
have that, along with a single sub-cycle c = 〈4, 5〉, S consists of 8 sub-chains:
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c′1 = 〈1, 6〉, c′2 = 〈2, 3〉, c′3 = 〈2, 3, 4〉, c′4 = 〈2, 3, 4, 5〉, c′5 = 〈2, 3, 4, 6〉, c′6 = 〈2, 4〉,
c′7 = 〈2, 4, 5〉, c′8 = 〈2, 4, 6〉. Note that all pairs and NDDs in S can participate in a
sub-cycle of size 3 or less, or a sub-chain of length 3 or less, and that S is connected
such that any partition of the vertex set into two parts will result in the loss of a
valid sub-cycle or sub-chain, defining features that characterize S as a suitable
LRS.
LRSs as a class of transplant arrangements are more thoroughly examined in
Wang et al. (2018), where methods of enumeration are also described.
2.2.2 Optimization with Locally Relevant Subgraphs
The optimization problem of interest can be written in a similar manner as (1.2).
For S ∈ LRS(G;x, y, L), let EUS represent the expected utility of S. Subsequent
sections will focus on the calculation of EUS for all S ∈ LRS(G;x, y, L) under the
probability model defined previously, as necessary input to the optimization problem.
For each vertex i ∈ V , let LRS(i) = {S ∈ LRS(G;x, y, L) : i ∈ VS}
⊆ LRS(G;x, y, L), the set of all LRSs in LRS(G;x, y, L) that involve vertex i.
Define a decision variable YS, with YS = 1 if S ∈ LRS(G;x, y, L) is selected, and
YS = 0 otherwise. The problem of selecting the optimal set of disjoint LRSs in G









YS ≤ 1, ∀ i ∈ V,
YS ∈ {0, 1} ,∀ S ∈ LRS(G;x, y, L).
(2.1)
Thus, our aim is to select disjoint LRSs in LRS(G;x, y, L) so as to maximize the
total expected utility. The restrictions are such that no pair or NDD can appear in
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more than one LRS. As in the traditional formulation, the problem, though possibly
computationally extensive, can be solved with the aid of IP software such as Gurobi
(Gurobi Optimization Inc.).
All sub-cycles and sub-chains contained within S, along with all disjoint
combinations thereof, comprise the set of potential solutions, C∗S, to S. Assuming
reasonable size constraints on the LRS, potential solutions can be determined by
systematically examining each possible combination of sub-cycles and sub-chains,
eliminating those with overlapping vertex sets. We note that, with the increase in
uncertainty as the size of sub-cycles and sub-chains grows, we constrain sub-cycles
and sub-chains to relatively small sizes and lengths, typically at most 3 in each case
(such that x = y = 3).
We let potential solution C∗ = (VC∗ , EC∗) ∈ C∗S, be represented in graph notation,
where the vertex set VC∗ and edge set EC∗ are the unions of the vertex and edge
sets of its constituent sub-cycles and sub-chains. The utility of C∗ is given by UC∗ =∑
c∈C∗ Uc =
∑
e∈EC∗ ue, the sum of the utilities of the sub-cycles and sub-chains
involved in that potential solution.
After confirming availability of donors and candidates and viability of transplants
in a selected LRS S, we obtain S¯ = (VS¯, ES¯), the so-called observed subgraph of S,
where VS¯ ⊆ VS and ES¯ ⊆ {e ≡ (i, j) ∈ ES : i, j ∈ VS¯}. The set of potential solutions
that remain in S¯ is then given by C ∗¯
S
⊆ C∗S. Transplants are ultimately realized from




that maximizes the utility. Let
CS¯ be the set of all sub-cycles and sub-chains remaining in S¯, with c = (Vc, Ec) ∈ CS¯





can be formally obtained as the
solution to an IP problem similar to (2.1), in which LRS(G;x, y, L) is replaced with
CS¯, S is replaced with c, and EUS is replaced with Uc.
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Returning to our example LRS depicted in Figure 2.2, assuming an equal utility
of 1 for each match, the total utilities of each of the 9 sub-cycles and sub-chains are
listed in Table 2.1. The remaining potential solutions, of which there are 8, arise from
disjoint combinations of these sub-cycles and sub-chains, and are listed in Table 2.2
in set notation. In total, there are 18 possible solutions that can result from this
LRS, including the situation where no transplants are ultimately possible.
Table 2.1: Sub-cycles and sub-chains for example LRS depicted in Figure 2.2.
Cycle/Chain Utility
c = 〈4, 5〉 2
c′1 = 〈1, 6〉 1
c′2 = 〈2, 3〉 1
c′3 = 〈2, 3, 4〉 2
c′4 = 〈2, 3, 4, 5〉 3
c′5 = 〈2, 3, 4, 6〉 3
c′6 = 〈2, 4〉 1
c′7 = 〈2, 4, 5〉 2
c′8 = 〈2, 4, 6〉 3
Table 2.2: Potential solutions involving combinations of sub-cycles and sub-chains for LRS depicted
in Figure 2.2.
Potential Solution Utility








The potential solutions in Table 2.2 are arranged in non-increasing order of their
utilities. The first two of these potential solutions represent ideal scenarios where all
four candidates in the LRS receive a transplant. For viable solutions that are tied in
utility, a secondary criterion can be added in order to determine their precedence.
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2.3 Calculation of Expected Utilities for Locally Relevant Subgraphs
In this section, we describe methods for assigning an appropriate EUS value for
a given subgraph S ∈ LRS(G;x, y, L).
2.3.1 Exact Calculation by Subgraph Enumeration
The crux of the exact calculation for expected utility hinges on considering every
possible observed subgraph within S and determining its maximum utility as
described in the previous section. Then, EUS is obtained by multiplying the
probability of observing each subgraph by its maximum utility, and taking the sum
over all possible observed subgraphs.
Consider vertex subset V¯ ⊆ VS. The probability that only the pairs and NDDs
represented by V¯ remain available for transplantation is given by







Let SV¯ = (V¯ , EV¯ ) denote the subgraph induced by V¯ , where the edge set EV¯ is
given by EV¯ = {e = (i, j) ∈ ES : i, j ∈ V¯ }. Now consider edge subset E¯ ⊆ EV¯ . The
probability that only the matches represented by E¯ remain viable for transplantation
is given by







With S¯ = (V¯ , E¯) representing the observed subgraph of S, its solution C ∗¯
S
can
be obtained as the solution to the IP problem (2.1). For subgraphs with reasonable
size constraints, this solution may be deduced by simple inspection. The utility
associated with C ∗¯
S










ue. The expected utility
EUS of S is then obtained by taking the sum of all of the individual utilities for each



















We illustrate the steps to calculate the expected utility for the LRS depicted in
Figure 2.3, made up of a single NDD V A = {1} and three incompatible donor-
candidate pairs V P = {2, 3, 4}. There are three possible sub-chains, denoted by
c′1 = 〈1, 2〉, c′2 = 〈1, 2, 3〉, c′3 = 〈1, 2, 3, 4〉, and one possible sub-cycle, denoted by c =
〈2, 3, 4〉. Table 2.3 summarizes the possible observed subgraphs alongside calculations
required for each such subgraph with at least one remaining viable sub-cycle or sub-
chain. Recall that we denote the probability of success of e = (i, j) ∈ E¯, i, j ∈ V¯ and
its utility by pe ≡ pij and ue ≡ uij respectively. The expected utility is obtained by
multiplying the values in the P (V¯ ), P (E¯|V¯ ), and UC∗¯
S
columns in each row of Table
2.3, and then taking the sum across all of the rows.
Figure 2.3: Example of a LRS of size 4 made up of a single NDD V A = {1} (in black), and three
incompatible donor-candidate pairs V P = {2, 3, 4} (in white).
In a setting where a KPD program is restricted to selecting only cycles or chains,
without recourse to fallback options, the previous calculations can be simplified. For
cycles, if any of the pairs involved are unable to proceed to transplantation, or any
of the matches are proven non-viable after a laboratory crossmatch, the cycle cannot
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Table 2.3: Exact expected utility calculation by subgraph enumeration for LRS depicted in
Figure 2.3.




S¯1 {1, 2} q1q2(1− q3)×
(1− q4)
{(1, 2)} p12 c′1 u12
S¯2 {1, 2, 3} q1q2q3(1− q4) {(1, 2)} p12(1− p23) c′1 u12
S¯3
...
... {(1, 2), (2, 3)} p12p23 c′2 u12 + u23
S¯4 {1, 2, 4} q1q2(1− q3)q4 {(1, 2)} p12(1− p42) c′1 u12
S¯5
...
... {(1, 2), (4, 2)} p12p42 c′1 u12
S¯6 {2, 3, 4} (1− q1)q2q3q4 {(2, 3), (3, 4), (4, 2)} p23p34p42 c u23 + u34 + u42





... {(1, 2), (2, 3)} p12p23(1− p34)(1− p42) c′2 u12 + u23
S¯9
...
... {(1, 2), (3, 4)} p12(1− p23)p34(1− p42) c′1 u12
S¯10
...
... {(1, 2), (4, 2)} p12(1− p23)(1− p34)p42 c′1 u12
S¯11
...
... {(1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 4)} p12p23p34(1− p42) c′3 u12 + u23 + u34
S¯12
...
... {(1, 2), (2, 3), (4, 2)} p12p23(1− p34)p42 c′2 u12 + u23
S¯13
...
... {(1, 2), (3, 4), (4, 2)} p12(1− p23)p34p42 c′1 u12
S¯14
...
... {(2, 3), (3, 4), (4, 2)} (1− p12)p23p34p42 c u23 + u34 + u42
S¯15
...
... {(1, 2), (2, 3),
(3, 4), (4, 2)}
p12p23p34p42 c or c
′
3 max {u12 + u23 + u34,
u23 + u34 + u42}
proceed. Let c = 〈i1, . . . , i`〉 be a cycle of size `. Denote e1 = (i`, i1), and for
k = 2, . . . , `, let ek = (ik−1, ik). Finally, for k = 1, . . . , `, let pek and qik denote the
probability of success of ek and of pair ik, respectively, and let Uc =
∑`
k=1 uek be the







In some transplant centers, it may be administratively permissible for chains to
be transplanted up to the first point of failure. As such, an appropriate expected
utility calculation for chains in this setting would take into account direct sub-chains
of the original chain as fallback options. Consider a chain c′ = 〈i0, i1, · · · , i`〉 of




t=1 uet be the utility of
transplanting up to the candidate of pair ik. The utility of the complete chain is




t=1 uet . The expected utility calculation for chains in this






















The first summand accounts for situations where the chain reaches the candidate of
pair ik for k ∈ {1, . . . , `−1}, with failure occurring in the transplant to the candidate
of pair ik+1. The second summand accounts for the complete chain being realized.
2.3.2 Exact Calculation by Inclusion-Exclusion
While intuitive, the method in Section 2.3.1 requires searching through every
possible vertex-edge subset within each LRS under review. As there are 2|VS |
possible vertex subsets within S, where each vertex subset V¯ induces a subgraph
which itself has 2|EV¯ | possible edge subsets, computations can quickly become
prohibitive for even moderately-sized LRSs. Fortunately, due to the restricted size
of the LRS, enumerating the sub-cycles and sub-chains within a LRS and
determining the potential solutions within is straightforward. Here, we use the
principle of inclusion-exclusion to calculate the probabilities that each potential
solution will be realized as the best option for transplantation, which can then be
used to calculate the expected utility of the LRS.
Suppose S is a LRS with |C∗S| = K potential solutions, denoted C∗1 , C∗2 , . . . , C∗K .
Without loss of generality, we suppose that these potential solutions have been
arranged in non-increasing order of their utilities, such that
UC∗1 ≥ UC∗2 ≥ · · · ≥ UC∗K .
We represent C∗k = (VC∗k , EC∗k ) in graph notation. With a slight abuse of notation,
we also let C∗k represent the event that potential solution C
∗
k is viable. This is the















simultaneously viable, denoted here by C∗k1C
∗
k2
, k1, k2 ∈ {1, . . . , K}, k1 < k2, can be
identified similarly based on whether every distinctive vertex and edge involved in
either of the two options is viable. In other words, the vertex set and edge set are
given by VC∗k1

















The joint probabilities of any 3, 4, . . . , K potential solutions being simultaneously
viable can all be determined in a similar manner.
For k = 1, . . . , K, we denote by Pk the probability that the potential solution
C∗k will be selected as the optimal solution for S. It follows that P1 = P (C
∗
1), as
the probability that the best potential solution is selected depends only on whether
or not it is viable. For k = 2, . . . , K, C∗k will be only be preferentially selected if
it remains viable, and those potential solutions C∗k′ , k
′ = 1, . . . , k − 1, with higher
precedence according to utility are found to no longer be viable. Thus, denoting the
difference between two arbitrary sets A and B by A − B = {x ∈ A : x /∈ B}, we




































C∗k)± . . . (−1)k−1P (C∗1 · · ·C∗k) ,
(2.9)
where each individual probability term can be calculated as described above in (2.7)





Returning to our previously worked example from Section 2.3.1, suppose we prefer
transplanting the sub-cycle c over the long sub-chain c′3 (i.e. u42 > u12). Our













with UC∗1 = u23 + u34 + u42, UC∗2 = u12 + u23 + u34, UC∗3 = u12 + u23, and UC∗4 = u12.
Using inclusion-exclusion as in (2.9), the probability of each solution being selected
is given as follows:
1. For C∗1 , P1 = P (C
∗
1)
2. For C∗2 , P2 = P (C
∗
2)− P (C∗1C∗2)
3. For C∗3 , P3 = P (C
∗
3)− P (C∗1C∗3)− P (C∗2C∗3) + P (C∗1C∗2C∗3)
4. For C∗4 ,
















The values of each of the individual probability terms are calculated as in (2.7)
and (2.8). For example, P (C∗1), the probability of the sub-cycle c = 〈2, 3, 4〉 being
viable, is given by q2q3q4p23p34p42, while P (C
∗
4), the probability of the smallest sub-
chain c′3 = 〈1, 2〉 being viable is given by q1q2p12. The probability of both of these
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options remaining viable is effectively the probability of every pair, NDD and match
in the LRS remaining viable, such that P (C∗1C
∗
4) = q1q2q3q4p12p23p34p42.
Using inclusion-exclusion in this manner is preferable to the subgraph enumeration
method from Section 2.3.1 when the number of potential solutions is small relative
to the number of possible observed subgraphs, as we avoid having to calculate the
probability and utility of every possible vertex-edge subset of the original LRS, many
of which will have no remaining sub-cycles or sub-chains and thus will not contribute
to the expected utility calculation.
2.3.3 Matrix Formulation
We can formulate a matrix implementation to simplify the expected utility
computations. Suppose S is a LRS with K potential solutions, denoted by
C∗1 , C
∗
2 , . . . , C
∗
K , again ordered such that UC∗1 ≥ UC∗2 ≥ · · · ≥ UC∗K . As a convention,
we will let C∗0 = ∅, where no solution is viable, with UC∗0 = 0. Also, let H denote
the number of possible observed subgraphs of S.
We construct matrices A and B, representing the subgraphs and the potential
solutions of S respectively, as follows. Let the h-th subgraph Sh = (Vh, Eh) be an














Suppose the vertices in VS and edges in ES are numbered 1, . . . , |VS| and |VS| +
1, . . . , |S|, respectively, where |S| = |VS|+ |ES|. Denote a vector of binary variables
by Ah = [a1h a2h . . . a|S|h]T ∈ {0, 1}|S|, where the h-th element is given by
aih =

1 (i ∈ Vh) , 1 ≤ i ≤ |VS|
1 (i ∈ Eh) , |VS|+ 1 ≤ i ≤ |S|.
(2.12)
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Each vector Ah characterizes a subgraph by both its vertices and edges. Let
A = [A1, . . . , AH ], the |S|×H matrix of all possible valid subgraphs within the LRS.
Similarly, let B = (bik) be the |S| ×K matrix characterizing the potential solutions












, |VS|+ 1 ≤ i ≤ |S|.
(2.13)
Let W = BTA, where wkh gives the number of vertices and edges in common
between the k-th potential solution and the h-th observable subgraph. Also, let
t = BT1, where 1 is a vector of ones. The elements tk of t correspond to the total
number of vertices and edges, or pairs/NDDs and matches, involved in the potential
solution. For each h = 1, . . . , H, let
kh =

min{k ∈ 1, . . . , K : tk = wkh} if ∃ k ∈ 1, . . . , K st. tk = wkh
0 o.w.,
(2.14)
be the preferred potential solution for the corresponding subgraph. The expected






In this manner, some redundant calculations are avoided when comparing to the
method described in Section 2.3.1. We require the list of potential solutions be
pre-specified, as in 2.3.2.
2.3.4 Estimation by Monte Carlo Sampling
Exact calculations described in the previous sections can become computationally
prohibitive as the size of the LRSs under consideration, and thus the number of
fallback options, is allowed to increase. The LRS in Figure 2.2, for example, has 370
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observable subgraphs and 18 potential solutions. The inclusion-exclusion procedure
would then involve calculating up to 217 probability terms. Enumerating the possible
observed subgraphs and determining the optimal potential solution as in Section
2.3.3 is an improvement, but still involves a significant amount of calculation. In
such cases, it may be preferable, or even necessary, to approximate the expected
utility to be used in place of an exact expected utility.
Due to the presumed independence between pair failures, as well as match failures
conditional on the availability of the pairs, a simple Monte Carlo sampling procedure
can be used to obtain an appropriate expected utility. For a given LRS, we separately
sample whether each pair or NDD succeeds, followed by whether each match between
successful pairs and NDDs succeeds. This yields a sampled observed subgraph, the
utility of which can be determined by a maximum utility selection among its sub-
cycles and sub-chains, as in Section 2.3.1. By determining all potential solutions
and their precedence within the LRS beforehand, we can also instead compare the
sampled subgraph to the potential solutions C∗1 , C
∗
2 , . . . , C
∗
K in sequence, recording
the utility of the first of these potential solutions that remains viable. Repeating
either of these procedures for a large number of iterations, one then assigns to the
LRS an expected utility given by the average of the utilities of the sampled subgraphs.
This sampling procedure can be implemented using matrix multiplication as in
Section 2.3.3. Consider sampled subgraphs Sn = (Vn, En) , n = 1, . . . , N , where N is
the number of sampled subgraphs, and let A˜n = [a˜1n a˜2n · · · a˜|S|n]T be a vector of
binary variables similar to that shown in (2.12), where in this case,
a˜in =

1 (i ∈ Vn) , 1 ≤ i ≤ |VS|





A˜1, · · · , A˜N
]
, the |S| × N matrix of sampled subgraphs (note that this
matrix is not the same as A from Section 2.3.3). Let B be the same as described by
(2.13) in Section 2.3.3, and t = BT1 as before. Let W˜ = BT A˜, where w˜kn gives the
number of vertices and edges, or pairs/NDDs and matches, in common between the
k-th potential solution and the n-th sampled subgraph. For each n = 1, . . . , N , let
kn =

min{k ∈ 1, . . . , K : tk = w˜kn} if ∃ k ∈ 1, . . . , K st. tk = w˜kn
0 o.w.
(2.17)
be the optimal solution for the n-th sampled subgraph. The estimated expected







2.4 Comparison of Expected Utility Methods
We perform simulation experiments to evaluate the expected utility methods
presented in Section 2.3. In the first experiment, Table 2.4 displays the running
time needed to calculate or estimate the expected utility for LRSs of size 3, 4, and
5, comprised only of pairs in which every donor is found to match every other
candidate. In other words, the underlying subgraph is complete. With the
maximum sub-cycle size set to 3, the number of potential solutions is 5, 17, and 65,
for subgraphs of size 3, 4, and 5 respectively. Note that the reported running times
for the estimation method are based on 1000 Monte Carlo sample subgraphs of the
LRS. The failure probability was set to 0.5 for all pairs, and to 0.2 for all matches.
From Table 2.4, it is clear that exact expected utility calculation becomes
prohibitive as the size of the subgraph and the number of potential solutions
increase. With complete graphs, even for a LRS of size 4, estimating the expected
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Table 2.4: Time (in milliseconds) to determine expected utility for pairs-only complete subgraphs.
Expected Utility Method 3 Pairs 4 Pairs 5 Pairs
Subgraph Enumeration 1.00 182.21 4.42 ×106
Inclusion-Exclusion 0.16 1237.18 (Not Completed)
Monte Carlo Estimation (1000 Iterations) 1.34 2.53 4.85
utility is preferred over exact calculation. It should be noted, however, that
observing a complete graph of large size would be uncommon in practice. These
complete graph experiments correspond to the most computationally challenging
worst-case scenarios.
In a second experiment, we generated LRSs comprised of exactly 5 pairs and
consisting of either 9, 10, 11 or 12 matches. 10,000 LRSs of each specified number
of matches were generated at random, and their expected utilities were calculated
both by inclusion-exclusion and by estimation based on 1,000 Monte Carlo samples.
Failure probabilities were the same as in the previous experiment. Figure 2.4
displays the expectation and standard error, stratified by number of matches and
potential solutions, of the relative difference in expected utility values obtained by
estimation ÊUS, and exact calculation, EUS, given by the difference in estimated
and exact expected utilities, divided by the exact expected utility. Note that
Figure 2.4 plots a random sample of 1,000 LRSs within each stratum comprising at
least 1,000 generated LRSs. Also note that estimation precision will increase with
the number of samples, as the standard error is of order 1/
√
N , where N again
represents the number of samples used to estimate the expected utility. In terms of
runtime, for a given number of matches, the superiority of estimation relative to
exact calculation increases as the number of potential solutions increases. Such
experiments may be utilized to determine suitable thresholds at which to switch
between estimating and calculating the expected utility in practice.
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Figure 2.4: Relative difference in expected utility, split by number of potential solutions.
Finally, we compare solutions obtained by exact calculation and estimation of
expected utility, using either 100 or 1000 iterations for estimation, for LRSs in a
pool of 100 pairs (no NDDs). Candidate information is based on data from 380
incompatible donor-candidate pairs from the Alliance for Paired Donation. Each pair
is generated by sampling a candidate with replacement, and by assigning a randomly-
generated donor, where the blood type is sampled based on the marginal blood type
probabilities in kidney transplant donors from the Scientific Registry of Transplant
Recipients, and HLA information is sampled from the HLA profile frequencies from
the Bone Marrow Transplant Registry (Maiers et al., 2007). If the donor generated
through this procedure is found to be compatible with the selected candidate, we
re-generate donor characteristics until an incompatible donor is obtained. LRSs are
constrained to a maximum size of 4, with sub-cycles of maximum size 3.
Each donor is assessed for compatibility with all other candidates by virtual
crossmatch, and the best LRS solution in terms of expected utility is produced. In
order to introduce additional variability to the expected utility assignments,
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instead of optimizing in terms of the number of transplants, we assign a utility
value to each match from a continuous uniform distribution, U(1, 10). All
candidates are assumed to fail with probability 0.25, donors with probability 0.10,
and matches with probability drawn from a continuous uniform distribution,
U(0, 0.25). For each estimated utility solution, we calculate the corresponding exact
expected utility of the selected subgraphs. Simulations were written in C++, and
optimal solutions were selected using the linear programming software Gurobi
(Gurobi Optimization Inc.).
Across 50 such generated pools, the average relative difference between the exact
expected utility solution and the true expected utility of the estimated utility
solution, using 100 iterations per LRS, is 0.0104, corresponding to a roughly 1%
loss in expected utility due to the approximation. For the estimated solution using
1000 iterations per LRS, this average relative difference drops to 0.0012,
representing a roughly 0.1% loss in expected utility. Again, the ability to measure
the accuracy of the approximation relative to the true expected utility can aid in
choosing an appropriate number of iterations to employ in the estimation, given the
number of matches or potential solutions within the LRS, for example.
2.5 Simulation
We evaluate several optimization settings with respect to the number of realized
transplants and their characteristics over the course of several match runs in a
realistic dynamic model of a KPD program, similar to that outlined in Ashlagi
et al. (2011).
Here we use de-identified data on 538 donor-candidate pairs and 55 NDDs
(including bridge donors) from the APD. The data set includes donor and
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candidate blood type, HLA information for the donors, and unacceptable HLA
information and panel reactive antibody (PRA) for the candidates. The PRA value
represents the estimated percentage of donors to which the candidate is expected
not to match in a typical pool of donors. Note that this value is an estimation,
such that a candidate with a PRA of 0, for example, may not necessarily denote
complete non-sensitization (Velidedeoglu et al., 2018). Using this information on
donors and candidates, a virtual crossmatch is performed for every possible
combination of donor and candidate, by assessing blood type and HLA
compatibility.
For each match, we assign a probability that the transplant will turn out to be
non-viable, which we base on the PRA of the candidate. These baseline probabilities
are the same as in Ashlagi et al. (2011), who remark that they are empirically
determined. For candidates with a PRA between 0 and 24, the baseline failure
probability is 0.05; between 25 and 49, the probability is 0.2; between 50 and 74,
the probability is 0.35; between 75 and 100, the probability is 0.5. Additional failure
probabilities of 20% are added to these baseline values in a sensitivity analysis to
reflect potentially higher probabilities of match failure due to candidate, donor or
transplant center preferences. We also consider the probability that each selected
pair would be unable to proceed to transplant, which we take to be 0% or 20% in
our simulations.
We consider three optimization settings. The simplest setting, “Cycles and
Chains”, involves simply maximizing the utility of the selected cycles and chains,
the standard approach in KPD. The second setting, “Cycles and Chains with
Fallbacks”, takes failure probabilities into account and aims to select the set of
cycles and chains with the largest expected utility, under the assumption that
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fallback options will be taken in cases of non-viability. The final setting, “Locally
Relevant Subgraphs”, implements our LRS approach, aiming to maximize the set of
LRSs with the largest expected utility, given uncertainty and fallback options.
Optimal solutions were again obtained using Gurobi (Gurobi Optimization Inc.).
Simulation parameters and conditions follow those in Ashlagi et al. (2011). Two
hundred simulations of evolving KPD pools over 8 match runs are performed. At
the beginning of each simulation, 30 incompatible pairs and 1 NDD for each of the 8
match runs are sampled with replacement from the APD dataset. We consider DPD
chains, with implicit final donation to the deceased donor waitlist, with a maximum
length of 2, as well as NEAD chain segments, where the final donor is retained as
a bridge donor for future match runs, with maximum lengths of 3, 4 and 5. Each
generated pool is evaluated under each of the different optimization settings and
specified maximum chain lengths.
After selection, proposed transplants can fail to proceed, either due to positive
lab crossmatch, based on the match failure probability, or if one of the pairs
involved is unable to proceed to transplant, based on the pair failure probability.
For all matches that remain, success probabilities are updated after evaluation, to 1
if successful and 0 otherwise, for use in future calculations. Following completion of
each match run, each pair in the pool has a 2% chance of permanently leaving the
pool prior to the next match run. Bridge donors have a renege rate of 1%,
representing the rate at which they renege on their commitment to continue the
chain after their associated recipient receives their transplant. Chains which would
leave bridge donors with blood type AB are not considered in the simulation.
NDDs and bridge donors remaining at the end of the final match run are recorded
as giving rise to one additional transplant, reflecting their potential to provide
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further transplants in future match runs.
Note that, due to computational complexity, the Cycles and Chains with Fallbacks
scheme is only evaluated for chain segments of maximum length 4 in each match run.
The Locally Relevant Subgraphs scheme considers LRSs of size 3 or less, restricting
to sub-chains of maximum length 2, and those of size 4 or less, restricting to sub-
chains of maximum length 3. For more details about the simulation, we refer the
reader to Bray et al. (2015).
Figure 2.5 plots the ratio of the number of transplants achieved under each
simulation setting, compared to the Cycles and Chains simulation with maximum
chain length of 2. We observe that simply maximizing the number of transplants
through cycles and chains, without taking into account the probabilities of failure
or fallback options, delivers diminishing returns as chain segment length increases
beyond 4. As compared to the simplest simulation setting, we obtain between 2%
to 44% more transplants by using a fallback option approach with increasing
allowance for longer chains. In general, the advantage of schemes with fallback
options over the standard KPD approach increases as the failure probabilities
increase. The Locally Relevant Subgraphs setting with maximum chain length of 3
outperformed all other schemes regardless of maximum chain length considered,
providing the largest number of realized transplants in all simulations.
The distribution of blood types among transplant recipients is similar for all
optimization, chain length, and failure probability settings. Similarly, we do not
observe any differences between optimization settings in the proportion of
candidates of each blood type receiving a transplant over the course of the match
runs. It is interesting to note that an approach that only considers an expected
utility based on failure probabilities, but without accounting for fallback options,
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Figure 2.5: Ratio of number of realized transplants for each optimization scheme compared to the
Cycles and Chains setting with maximum chain length of 2 (DPD), under various pair and match
failure probability settings. Baseline match failures are assumed based on candidate PRA.
would be expected to introduce bias against higher PRA candidates for whom
selected transplants are less likely to be completed. Taking account of fallback
options at the optimization stage, however, greatly reduces these biases. It appears
that incorporating fallback options in the optimization tends to allow for more
candidates with high PRA in the selected solutions, since the penalty for their
inclusion is reduced by accounting for the ability to take fallback options where
possible.
2.6 Discussion
In this chapter, we detailed the calculation of expected utility for a more general
class of transplant arrangements, the locally relevant subgraphs, in a KPD program,
assuming the possibility of selected pairs or matches being unable to proceed to
transplantation and the pursuit of fallback options in such cases. We described exact
and sampling-based estimation methods for assigning expected utility values to such
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arrangements. It is clear that solutions involving many fallback options should be
preferred in a KPD program.
The issue of searching for relevant subgraphs within the KPD network, as well
as for sub-cycles and sub-chains within these subgraphs, are themselves interesting
problems. These operations can be computationally expensive, so procedures that
streamline this process are beneficial in practice. The strategy of decomposing a large
KPD network into a set of small cohesive subgraphs with high numbers of fallback
options is desirable to make the proposed expected utility calculations useful and
practically appealing. Algorithms for searching a KPD graph for relevant subgraphs
have been studied in Wang et al. (2018).
A number of recent studies attempt to address the practical and computational
bottlenecks in the KPD problem. Blum et al. (2015) propose pre-testing some small
number of promising potential matches for a certain subset of patient-donor pairs
in a KPD program, and show by simulation the expected effect on the number of
realized exchanges. Pedroso (2014) assemble a database of possible configurations
of subgraphs up to a given size, and store the function calculating the expected
utility to be assigned along with each of the configurations. With appropriate data
structures, it is computationally acceptable to search this database for a graph which
is isomorphic to the subgraph under consideration. This idea of storing the types of
subgraphs to be considered can further be extended to include NDDs (Alvelos et al.,




A Generalized Model for Kidney Paired Donation
3.1 Introduction
The standard formulation for KPD assumes that each transplant candidate joins
the program with a single incompatible donor. However, it is possible for a transplant
candidate to join KPD with more than one incompatible donor, with organ exchanges
involving any one of these donors. Here, we extend and generalize the previously
studied model for KPD, with the possibility of failure and the recourse to fallback
options, to include candidates joining KPD with any number of incompatible donors.
We also consider a state transition model for individual donor and candidate failures,
where KPD participants alternate between active and inactive participation in the
KPD program over time. Note that we will continue to use the term “pair”, referring
in this context to a transplant candidate and all of his or her associated incompatible
donors.
3.2 Modeling Candidates with Multiple Incompatible Donors
To reflect the possibility of candidates joining KPD with more than one
incompatible donor, we adapt the original KPD network G = (V,E) to allow each
individual vertex to have multiple edges to other vertices. In other words, we now
consider G as a directed multigraph.
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Let V = V P ∪ V A as before. Here we consider pair vi = (ri, Di) ∈ V P , where ri
represents the candidate (r stands for “recipient”), and Di = {di1, ..., diMi} represents
the set of Mi ≥ 1 incompatible donors associated with candidate ri. Note that for
NDD vi ∈ V A, Di = {di1} ≡ di. Let Eij be the set of all matches between donors Di
of vi ∈ V , and the candidate rj of vj ∈ V P . That is, we have that
Eij = {eimj ≡ (dim, rj) : m ∈ {1, ...,Mi}, vi ∈ V, vj ∈ V P , i 6= j,
successful virtual crossmatch from donor m of vi to candidate of vj}.
(3.1)
It follows that E =
⋃
vi∈V, vj∈V P , i6=j Eij.
Figure 3.1 gives an example of a LRS involving a multiple donor pair. The LRS
has three pairs, where pair v1 has two donors, such that D1 = {d11, d12}. Pairs v2
and v3 each have a single donor, such that D2 = {d21} ≡ d2 and D3 = {d31} ≡ d3.
There are three potential solutions in this LRS. Two sub-cycles of size 3 are possible
between these pairs, with the first transplant to candidate r2 coming either from
donor d11 or d12. Should either of these options prove to be non-viable, there is a
fallback option, a sub-cycle of size 2 between pairs 1 and 3. However, this cycle is
contingent on the availability of d11, since d12 is not compatible with r3, as is evident
by the absence of a match e123.
Again, we focus on the set of locally relevant subgraphs denoted by
LRS(G;x, y, L) for selection. For the purpose of determining appropriate LRSs to
consider within our KPD network, we can reduce the multigraph G to a simple
directed graph G′ = (V,E ′), by collapsing the multiple edges from one vertex to
another into a single edge, such that e = (i, j) ∈ E ′ ⇐⇒ Eij 6= ∅. In this way,
enumeration of LRSs proceeds as in Wang et al. (2018), and optimization proceeds
as in (2.1). The following sections describe the derivation of the appropriate
assignment of expected utility to assign to each LRS, given the additional fallback
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of a LRS involving three “pairs”, the first of which (top) having two
associated donors. For this pair, the portions of the LRS involving the first donor d11 are colored
in red, while those involving the second donor d12 are colored in blue, for ease of differentiation.
options afforded by the multiple donors.
3.2.1 Calculation of Expected Utilities with Multiple-Donor Candidates
Let uimj ∈ R+ represent the utility of the potential transplant from donor dim to
candidate rj, and pimj ∈ [0, 1] its probability of success. The probabilities of being
available through to transplantation associated with donor dim and candidate ri are
denoted as qdim and q
r
i respectively.
The expected utility calculation follows a similar procedure as in Section 2.3.1.
Here, the separation of probabilities of viability of the donors and the candidates
induces an extra layer of subsetting in the subgraph enumeration. Let S = (VS, ES) ∈
LRS(G;x, y, L) as before, and consider RS = {ri : vi ∈ VS}, the set of candidates
in the LRS. Consider a subset of the candidates, denoted R¯ ⊆ RS. The probability








(1− qri ) . (3.2)
Conditional on this set of candidates being available, consider the set DR¯ = {dim :
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vi ∈ VS, ri ∈ R¯,m ∈ {1, . . . ,Mi}}, which represents the set of all donors associated
with these candidates. Now consider a subset of these donors, denoted D¯ ⊆ DR¯. The
probability that this exact subset of donors will be available at the transplantation











Finally, conditional on this set of candidates and donors being available, consider
the set ED¯,R¯ = {eimj ∈ ES : vi, vj ∈ VS, i 6= j,m ∈ {1, . . . ,Mi}, rj ∈ R¯, dim ∈ D¯},
the remaining edges between donors from one pair to a candidate in another pair.
The probability that an exact subset E¯ ⊆ ED¯,R¯ of matches will be deemed viable for
transplantation is given by






(1− pimj) . (3.4)
The sets E¯, D¯, and R¯ characterize the observed subgraph S¯ = (V¯ , E¯), where V¯
can be reconstructed as V¯ = {vi ∈ V : ri ∈ R¯, ∃ m ∈ {1, . . . ,Mi} st. dim ∈ D¯}. C ∗¯S
then represents the optimal solution of sub-cycles and sub-chains within S¯, as before,






Uc. Note that, for sub-cycles with more than one
match from donors of a given pair to their assigned candidate, we select the donor
contributing the largest utility.
The expected utility of S is obtained by taking the sum of all of the individual
expected utilities for each observable donor-candidate-match subgraph, multiplied
























Multiple donors can be considered in settings where selection is restricted to
cycles and chains only, in which case calculations are simplified. In such settings,
we assume that, in cases where more than one donor from a pair match with a
candidate, fallback options can be arranged using the alternate donors. Suppose for
any vi ∈ V, vj ∈ V P , i 6= j, that the donors Di = {di1, di2, ..., diMi} are ordered such
that ui1j ≥ · · · ≥ uiMij. Without loss of generality, if there is no match between the
donor dim ∈ Di and rj, we have that uimj = 0.
In the case of cycles, we can correct the utility of a transplant between two pairs
vi and vj to account for the multiple donors as follows. First let u
†
ij represent a
“corrected” utility between vi and vj, reflecting the possibility of having to fall back
to an alternate donor. We begin by taking the maximum utility match in Eij, and
multiply the utility by the probabilities of the corresponding donor being available
and the match proving to be viable. Next, we add the utility of the second-best
match, multiplied by the probabilities of that match proving to be viable and the
donor involved being available, as well as the probability of the superior match failing,
either due to non-viability of the match or unavailability of the donor. This is followed
by the addition of the utility of the third-best match, multiplied by its probability
of viability and the probability of availability of the corresponding donor, as well as
the probability of the two superior matches failing. This procedure continues for all










Then, the “corrected” probability of a given donor in Di being selected for
transplantation is similarly given by the sum of the probabilities of success of each
donor multiplied by the probability of success of the corresponding match, further
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where the first term represents the probability that all candidates are available at
the time of transplantation, and the second term represents the corrected utility of
the cycle, accounting for fallbacks to alternate donors.
In the case of chains, we adapt the formulas from Dickerson et al. (2013) for pairs

































The first summand accounts for situations where the chain results in a transplant
to rk, k ∈ {1, ..., l − 1}, but with failure occurring as part of the transplant to rk+1.
The second summand accounts for the complete chain being realized.
As in the single-donor case, we can enumerate each potential solution within
a given LRS and use the inclusion-exclusion method to calculate the probabilities
needed for expected utility calculation. Suppose we have K potential solutions,
denoted C∗1 , . . . , C
∗
K , arranged in decreasing order of their total utilities UC∗1 ≥ ... ≥
UC∗K . Note that potential solutions consisting of the same pairs, but with different
donors facilitating the transplant, are distinct. Let C∗k = (VC∗k , EC∗k ) also represent
the event that C∗k is viable. Considering the probability associated with the specific
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The higher-order joint probabilities are calculated analogously to (2.8). The
probability Pk that the potential solution C
∗
k is realized within this LRS is again
given by (2.9) and the expected utility is calculated as (2.10). Similarly, the matrix
formulation and Monte Carlo estimation described in Sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4 can
also be generalized in a straightforward fashion, by extending cells in the matrix to
accommodate each possible donor, candidate, and match.
3.3 State Transition Model for Donor and Candidate Availability
We describe here a state transition model for donor and candidate availability,
meant to replicate the patterns of activity observed among donors and candidates
in real-life KPD programs. Suppose candidates and donors can be in one of three
states. Participants that are designated as “Active” are available for transplant
within the KPD. Donors or candidates designated as “Inactive” are not available
for transplantation, say due to illness, but otherwise remain part of the program.
Participants who are “Withdrawn” have been permanently removed from the
program due to illness, death or other extenuating circumstances.
Designate the three states as 1 =“Active”, 2 =“Inactive”, and 3 =“Withdrawn”.
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where the ij-th entry of Q is such that qij = limh→0+ P (X(t+ h) = j|X(t) = i) /h
(note that i 6= j), where X(t) represents the state occupied at time t. Withdrawal
represents an absorbing state.
The time an individual donor or candidate spends in the active state follows an
exponential distribution with rate λA→I+λA→W . At the end of this time interval, the
individual either moves to the inactive state with probability λA→I/(λA→I + λA→W )
or is withdrawn from the pool with probability λA→W/(λA→I + λA→W ). Similarly,
we assume the time spent in the inactive state follows an exponential distribution
with rate λI→A + λI→W , after which the individual either becomes active again with
probability λI→A/(λI→A + λI→W ), or is withdrawn from the pool with probability
λI→W/(λI→A + λI→W ). This process continues until the individual is withdrawn.
Assuming the donor or candidate is active at the time of selection, and that
transition to either inactive status or withdrawal signals that the donor or
candidate in question is no longer considered for the transplant, then the
probability of availability for transplantation, either qdim in the case of a donor or q
r
i
in the case of a candidate, is given by e−T (λA→I+λA→W ), where T represents the
interim time between selection and transplantation.
3.4 Simulation
We again perform 200 iterations of a dynamic KPD program under a variety of
settings, in a similar setup to Ashlagi et al. (2011) and Bray et al. (2015). Here, we
are primarily concerned with the number of realized transplants as well as waiting
times for candidates in the simulated KPD programs. In this simulation, donor-
candidate pairs and NDDs join our simulated KPD in continuous time by a Poisson
process over 8 months, with a match run occurring at the end of each month. A
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mean of 24 pairs and 1 NDD join each month.
Pairs are generated similarly to the previously reported simulations in Section 2.4.
For each candidate ri, either one or two associated donors are randomly generated,
with P (Mi = 2) = 1 − P (Mi = 1) = ρ. Donors are generated until the specified
number of incompatible donors are obtained, with those generated that are found
to be compatible with the candidate discarded. We consider settings with ρ ∈
{0, 0.2, 0.4}.
When a new pair or NDD joins the pool, each of the added donors is assessed
for compatibility by virtual crossmatch with all candidates currently in the pool,
and all donors currently in the program are assessed for compatibility with the new
candidate. Each individual donor and candidate joins the pool in the active state.
Match failure rates are set according to the panel reactive antibody (PRA) value
of the candidate as in Section 2.5. A utility value of 1 is assigned to each match,
such that the outcome of interest is effectively in terms of the number of realized
transplants.
Availability of individual donors and candidates for transplantation are assumed
to follow independent state transition models as described in Section 3.3.
Appropriate values for λA→I , λA→W , λI→A, and λI→W are determined based on the
following assumptions. We assume the individuals spend 80% of the time in the
active state and 20% of the time in the inactive state, with average times of about
4 months and 1 month in the active and inactive states respectively, and that the
overall withdrawal rate is approximately 2%. Further, we assume that withdrawals
are three times as likely while inactive than while active. To summarize, we have
that λA→I + λA→W = 0.25, λI→A + λI→W = 1, λA→W + λI→W = 0.02,
λI→W = 3λA→W . Solving, we obtain λA→I = 0.245, λA→W = 0.005, λI→A = 0.985,
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and λI→W = 0.015. A pair is available for a match run if both the candidate and at
least one donor is available, otherwise, it is not included in the match run. NDDs
are assumed to be available throughout the simulation.
We compare results for selection based on LRSs to those based on simple cycles
and chains (the Cycles and Chains setting). We also compare results between
candidates who join with two donors as opposed to one. At each match run, the
optimal solution, consisting of either cycles and chains or LRSs, depending on the
current setting, is collected. LRSs are constrained to a maximum of size 4, with
sub-cycles constrained to size 3, and sub-chains to length 3. Each cycle, chain, or
LRS is then assigned a utility value. In the Cycles and Chains setting, the simple
utility consisting of the sum of the utilities of the consituent matches is assigned,
though we allow fallbacks to the second donor where possible, as well as sub-chains
of the original chain. In the LRS setting, exact expected utilities are assigned,
accounting for uncertainty and fallback options, with the best remaining option
after evaluation within each LRS ultimately transplanted.
Transplantation is assumed to take place immediately prior to the next match run,
with the interim time (1 month) representing the time needed to assess compatibility
and availability. Each donor, candidate and match within the selected transplant
arrangements are evaluated and failures are determined. Candidates and donors
who were selected but become unavailable in the interim are marked as unable to
participate in the transplant arrangement for the remainder of this evaluation. For
all matches that remain, success probabilities are updated after evaluation, to 1 if
successful and 0 otherwise, for use in future calculations. Pairs and NDDs that were
included in transplant arrangements but not involved in an exchange are returned
to the KPD to participate in the next match run. For transplanted chains, the final
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donor is retained as a bridge donor, acting as a NDD in future match runs. For more
details about the simulation, we refer the reader to Bray et al. (2018).
Table 3.1: Average number of realized transplants and proportion of transplanted candidates across
200 simulations of a dynamic KPD program.











0 All Candidates 30.61 0.158 43.92 0.226
0.2 Candidates with
1 Donor
25.91 0.168 35.65 0.230
Candidates with
2 Donors
10.36 0.260 15.92 0.399
All Candidates 36.27 0.187 51.56 0.265
0.4 Candidates with
1 Donor
20.96 0.180 27.21 0.233
Candidates with
2 Donors
20.72 0.266 31.86 0.409
All Candidates 41.68 0.214 59.07 0.303
Results are displayed in Table 3.1. As expected, we observe improvement, in terms
of proportion of candidates transplanted, in the LRS approach over the classical
strategy based on simple cycles and chains. Two-donor candidates are shown to be
more likely to receive transplants in all settings as well. Kaplan-Meier curves showing
the candidate waiting time until transplantation under each simulation setting are
shown in Figure 3.2, with ρ = 0 on the leftmost chart, ρ = 0.2 in the center, ρ = 0.4
on the right. We observe a greater proportion of candidates with two donors receiving
transplants across the timeline of the simulation compared to candidates with a single
donor, in both the Cycles and Chains and Locally Relevant Subgraphs settings.
3.5 Discussion
In this chapter, we proposed further generalizations to the KPD model, to
account for candidates joining a program with several incompatible donors, and
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Figure 3.2: Kaplan-Meier curves for wait times of candidates across 200 simulations.
with a state transition model for individual donor or candidate failure. Additional
donors benefit both their candidate and the KPD program as a whole by
introducing new transplant opportunities, as well as additional fallback options for
their paired candidate, thereby increasing the number of transplant arrangements
and potential solutions in which the candidate is involved.
Here, we assume independence between the sources of potential failures, namely
the donors, candidates, and matches. There are clearly factors that may affect the
probability of availability after identification of a suitable exchange, for reasons
such as unanticipated scheduling issues or candidates becoming too ill to proceed to
transplantation, among others, but there do not exist sufficient data to estimate
these probabilities accurately. Fumo et al. (2015) report on investigations into
failed transplant offers, though these relate largely to match failures and candidate
refusals, as opposed to donor or candidate-specific failures. Future studies to
explore probability assignments in greater detail, preferably through a statistical
model of probabilities developed using clinical data, may be warranted, though
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data supporting more complicated models may not be easily available.
Related studies include investigations by Farina et al. (2017), who propose their
generalized approach to kidney exchange, which allows more than one donor to
participate in KPD with a given patient, and also allows for the possibility of a
donor willing to donate if any of a number of patients receive kidneys. Nicolo and
Rodr´ıguez-A´lvarez (2012) propose a framework inspired by the concept of exchange
among organ clubs. These clubs extend the notion of donor-candidate pairs,
allowing for a set of healthy donors equally willing to donate one of their kidneys in
exchange for an equal or greater number of kidneys received by a target set of
patients. While these situations may not be common in practice, our proposed
models may be further generalized to account for uncertainty and fallback options
in the setting of kidney exchange clubs.
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CHAPTER IV
On Modeling Temporal Aspects of Kidney Paired Donation
4.1 Introduction
KPD is an inherently temporal problem, with the composition of the pool
constantly changing as pairs and NDDs join and depart the KPD program for
various reasons, including transplantation and withdrawal, and potential matches
determined by virtual crossmatch are confirmed or rejected over time. These
temporal aspects, combined with the fact that algorithmic solutions in KPD are
myopic in nature, lead to certain inefficiencies, indicating the need for adaptive
strategies for organ allocation.
One salient feature of KPD programs is that patients can generally be
characterized by their difficulty to match with donors in the pool, with most of the
difficult-to-match candidates being highly sensitized against foreign HLA (Ashlagi
et al., 2013). The level of sensitization of a transplant candidate is typically
summarized by the PRA, where a PRA value of x suggests that the candidate is
expected to be unable to match with x% of the population. In the United States,
there are an estimated 14,000 kidney transplant candidates with a PRA greater
than 80 on the deceased donor waitlist (Velidedeoglu et al., 2018). In current
practice, KPD programs mostly benefit pairs that are easy-to-match, who form
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exchanges rapidly among themselves (Segev et al., 2008). The few options for
difficult-to-match pairs that may have existed are lost as their potential exchange
partners are quickly matched, transplanted, and depart from the program.
Figure 4.1 illustrates an example of a small KPD pool, initially comprising three
pairs at time t1, including a pair with a difficult-to-match patient A, and two other
pairs, B and C. An additional pair D joins the pool at a later time t2. In Figure
4.1(a), at time t1, pairs B and C can form a 2-way exchange, though a match
exists between B and difficult-to-match patient A. If this exchange proceeds to
transplantation before pair D joins the pool at t2, as in Figure 4.1(b), we lose the
match to A from B, and while the donor of A is found to match with the candidate
of D, we must wait again for a new pair to match with A so that it may form part
of an exchange cycle. Alternatively, by postponing transplantation until after t2 as
in Figure 4.1(c), new pair D is found to form a 3-way exchange with B and difficult-
to-match pair A. With three realized transplants, this solution is clearly the most
desirable option in the [t1, t2] time period, especially considering the opportunity for
A to participate in a cycle. The ability to transplant the larger cycle, including the
difficult-to-match patient with a rare compatible donor, would be lost by performing
the immediately available 2-way exchange between the two easy-to-match pairs at t1.
According to So¨nmez and U¨nver (2017), optimizing KPD in a greedy fashion leaves
the possibility that fewer overall transplants will ultimately be conducted.
Dickerson et al. (2014) posit that the prioritization of transplant opportunities
for the most difficult-to-match patients is currently one of the most contentious
issues in KPD. The standard model of KPD optimization tends to leave the pool in
a depleted state, with the remaining patients being largely difficult-to-match
(Awasthi and Sandholm, 2009). KPD optimization algorithms should be designed
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Figure 4.1: Example of (a) a small KPD pool with a pair that includes a difficult-to-match patient,
A, and two regular pairs, B and C, at time t1, (b) the pool after pair D joins at time t2 if the 2-way
exchange between B and C is transplanted, and (c) the pool after pair D joins at time t2 if B and
C remain in the pool.
to maximize the long-term utility, incorporating considerations that allow
preservation of compatible matches involving difficult-to-match pairs for future
exchanges.
Here, we attempt to capture the dynamics within a typical KPD program as a
first step toward an adaptive allocation policy for pairs. We propose to model the
progression of the KPD network via a 3-dimensional tensor, containing the sequence
of matrices that represent the compatibility of pairs in the pool. By employing
decomposition techniques on this tensor, we can extract low-dimensional features,
characterizing the pairs based on their propensity to match and form exchanges over
time. These characterizations can then be used to inform an allocation policy that,
say, preserves matches for difficult-to-match patients over a reasonable time horizon.
We also briefly outline alternative techniques for modeling the temporal progression
of a KPD program.
Note that, in this setting, we only consider single donor-candidate pairs. In other




We begin with an introduction to the basic tensor framework pertaining to our
proposed temporal model. We then describe the application of tensors in the KPD
context in Section 4.3. For additional background, Kolda and Bader (2009) provides
a comprehensive review of tensor analysis and decomposition.
4.2.1 Basics of Tensor Analysis
An N -dimensional or N -th order tensor is an element of the tensor product of
N vector spaces. In other words, an N -dimensional tensor can be denoted as Y ∈
RI1×I2×···×IN , where N ∈ {1, 2, . . . } = N+, and for n = 1, 2, . . . , N, In ∈ N+. A tensor
is essentially a higher-order analogue to vectors and matrices, where the former can
be regarded as first-order tensors, and the latter as second-order tensors. Certain
vector and matrix concepts can be extended to higher-order tensors. For example,
the norm of a tensor Y is the square root of the sum of the squares of all of its





· · ·∑INiN=1 x2i1i2···iN .
Fibers, the higher-order analogue to matrix rows and columns, are defined as
column vectors of a tensor, obtained by fixing every index of the tensor but one.
Similarly, two-dimensional sections of a tensor are referred to as slices, defined by
fixing all but two indices of the tensor. The mode-n matricization of tensor Y ,
denoted Y(n), arranges the mode-n fibers into columns, resulting in a flattening of the
tensor into a matrix. Note that the specific permutation of columns in a matricization
is not important, so long as it is consistent across related calculations. Certain matrix
multiplications are important in the context of tensors. In particular, the Khatri-





a1 ⊗ b1 a2 ⊗ b2 · · · aK ⊗ bK
]
, (4.1)
where ⊗ represents the Kronecker product.
We can construct a third-order tensor Y as a sequence of matrices, each matrix
forming a slice of the tensor. For temporal network data, these matrices are typically
the adjacency matrices W t of a network from times t = 1, . . . , T , where wtij = 1 if
an edge exists between vertices i and j, and wtij = 0 otherwise. Figure 4.2 illustrates
the form of such a Y across 4 time points.
Figure 4.2: Illustration of a sequence of network adjacency matrices across four timepoints as a
3-dimensional tensor.
4.2.2 Tensor Decomposition
We can decompose complex multi-dimensional patterns and extract
lower-dimensional features from a tensor by leveraging higher-order structure and
correlations within the data. Traditional matrix decomposition techniques are
inadequate when dealing with multidimensional or temporal data, as flattening
data into matrices can obscure important relations among variables. Tensor
decomposition has proven useful in domains such as data mining, dimensionality
reduction, pattern recognition and classification (Cichocki and Phan, 2009).
We first describe for context a basic method of tensor decomposition, the CP
decomposition, before turning attention to extensions appropriate for the KPD
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setting. An N -th order tensor Y is considered rank-one if it can be written as the







· · · a(N)iN , ∀1 ≤ in ≤ In. The CP decomposition, short for
“Canonical Decomposition/Parallel Factors”, factorizes a tensor into a sum of
component rank-one tensors (Cichocki and Phan, 2009). These components can be
interpreted as latent features of the data.
An approximation to 3-dimensional Y ∈ RI×J×K can be obtained as the sum
of R ∈ N+ rank-one tensors. In other words, the decomposition takes the form
Y ≈ ∑Rr=1 ar ◦ br ◦ cr, where ar ∈ RI , br ∈ RJ , and cr ∈ RK for r = 1, ..., R, with
R being the number of components in the tensor approximation. Concisely, we can
denote the CP decomposition as Y ≈ [[λ;A,B,C]] ≡ ∑Rr=1 λrar ◦ br ◦ cr, where the
factor matrices A ∈ RI×R, B ∈ RJ×R, and C ∈ RK×R denote the concatenation of
vectors from the rank-one components into matrices, such that A = [a1 a2 · · · aR],
and similarly for B and C. Columns of A,B, and C are normalized to length one,
with the weights absorbed into the vector of coefficients λ = [λ1 . . . λR]
T ∈ RR.
Factors A and B encode the community structure of the network (Gauvin et al.,
2014). Elements air and bir describe the weight of the outgoing and incoming
membership of vertex i to component r, respectively. Factor C gives the temporal
activity of each community, where elements ckr associate component r to the time
intervals k it spans, indicating activity level of each component as a function of
time. We note that the choice of R amounts to finding number of components that
best explain the tensor structure. With R too low, we obtain only the strongest
components, potentially overlooking important features. Conversely, an R too high
risks overfitting the data.
The relation between Y and its constituent factors are given by X(1) ≈ A(C 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B)T , X(2) ≈ B(C  A)T , and X(3) ≈ C(B  A)T , relating the matricizations along
each of the tensor modes to Khatri-Rao products among the factors (Kolda and
Bader, 2009). Based on this relation, an alternating least squares (ALS) approach
can be employed to find factor matrices for a given tensor algorithmically. An ALS
procedure for obtaining the factors starts by fixing B and C to solve for A, followed
by fixing A and C to solve for B and finally fixing A and B to solve for C, continuing
in this manner until some convergence criterion is satisfied. If we suppose B and




∥∥∥X(1) − Aˆ(C B)T∥∥∥
F
, (4.2)
where ‖·‖F denotes the Frobenius norm, such that for arbitrary matrix M , ‖M‖F =√
tr(MMT ). The update rule for A is given by A ← X(1)
[
(C B)T ]†. Updates
to B and C are obtained in an analogous fashion. While we focus on 3-dimensional
tensors here, this procedure can be generalized for N -th order tensors.
4.3 Adapting Kidney Paired Donation for Tensor Decomposition
We model the sequence of adjacency matrices over time in a KPD program as a
3-dimensional tensor. This tensor describes the time-course progression of
compatibility of pairs in a KPD pool, encoding both the topological and temporal
information of the donor-candidate pairs. In this case, the first and second modes,
given by the rows and columns of the tensor respectively, represent donor and
candidate connectivity, while the third mode represents progression of
compatibility over time. We seek the CP decomposition Y ≈ [[λ;A,B,C]]. In the
KPD setting, factors A and B can be interpreted as the “donor” and “candidate”
factors, where elements describe the weight of the outgoing and incoming matches
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of pair i to component r respectively.
Given the KPD network is constantly evolving, it would be preferable to
adaptively update pre-existing results given new data, without having to
re-compute the decomposition whenever new data arrives. Zhou et al. (2016) detail
an Accelerating Online Tensor Decomposition for third-order tensors to update
decomposition results in an online manner as new tensor slices are observed. The




 Yold(3) − C(1)(B  A)T






Cnew = Ynew(3){(B  A)T}†
 ,
(4.3)
where Yold represents the entire matricized history of network observations thus far
and Ynew represents a new matricized batch of network observations. The non-
temporal factors are then updated, beginning with A. In Zhou et al. (2016), the
update can be written in terms of Ynew and Cnew via A = PQ
−1, where
P ← P + Ynew(1)(Cnew B) ; Q← Q+ (CTnewCnew) ∗ (BTB), (4.4)
with ∗ denoting element-wise matrix multiplication, and P and Q having been
initialized at the beginning of the algorithm. Similarly, B = UV −1, where U and V
are analogous to P and Q, and with Ynew(2) and A replacing Ynew(1) and B in (4.4).
To avoid negative elements in the tensor decomposition, we also consider penalizing
such values by setting them to a small value , in a manner similar to the fast
hierarchical ALS for non-negative tensor factorization (Cichocki and Phan, 2009).
As a proof of concept, we aim to assess the effectiveness of tensor decomposition
in clustering pairs of different classes, say, easy versus difficult-to-match, in a small
dynamic KPD program. We simulate such a program, generating easy-to-match and
difficult-to-match single donor-candidate pairs entering the program over time. Ten
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pairs at a time are added to the pool over 20 time periods, resulting in a total of 200
pairs. Pairs are generated with 50% probability of being designated easy-to-match,
versus difficult-to-match. Matches between these pairs are generated such that 25%,
15% and 5% of possible connections are designated as potential matches between
two easy-to-match pairs, an easy-to-match and a difficult-to-match pair, and two
difficult-to-match pairs respectively. At regular intervals, a maximum utility cycle
solution is selected and evaluated for transplantation. We assign probabilities of 10%
and 25% of a match being overturned for an easy-to-match and difficult-to-match
candidate respectively, leaving the cycle untransplanted. Finally, between match
runs, we assign a probability of 10% of an untransplanted pair withdrawing from the
pool.
Figure 4.3: Trajectory of a subset of pairs in a simulated dynamic KPD program.
Figure 4.3 displays the trajectories of a subset of pairs in the simulation. Note
that we observe 98/112 (87.5%) easy-to-match and 49/88 (55.7%) difficult-to-match
pairs receiving transplants in this simulation, which is admittedly high compared to
clinical practice. Figure 4.4 displays components of tensor decompositions in both
“donor” and “candidate” factors recovered at the end of simulation. We observe
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Figure 4.4: Tensor decomposition weights in components for both the “donor” and “candidate”
factors in a simulated dynamic KPD program.
adequate separation between the easy-to-match and difficult-to-match clusters across
factors, especially in the “candidate” factor. While the factors themselves may not
have satisfying interpretation, the data patterns appear to be reasonably clear.
We note that standard CP decomposition, as well as the Accelerating Online
Tensor Decomposition method by Zhou et al. (2016), are typically applied to
continuous-valued tensors, whereas tensors that model connectivity over time, such
as our history of KPD adjacency matrices, contain binary-valued elements. In
principle, one can apply CP decomposition to a binary tensor, though such an
approach may result in sub-optimal performance. In particular, predicted values
can fall outside of the [0, 1] range.
To address this issue, Wang and Li (2018) propose a tensor decomposition that
can be viewed as a generalization of the classical CP decomposition to binary tensors,
in a way that is analogous to how GLMs generalize the standard linear model. It
is assumed that entries in binary tensor Y are realizations of independent Bernouilli
random variables, in that Y|Θ ∼ Ber (f (Θ)), with P (yi1i2···iN = 1) = f(θi1i2···iN ).
Here, the parameter tensor Θ = [θi1i2···iN ] is the unknown object of interest. In the
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KPD context, this could represent the underlying time-course propensities for pairs to
match, for example. Entries of Y are assumed to be mutually independent conditional




r ◦ · · · ◦
a
(N)
r . The function f is a known link function, analogous to link functions for GLMs
with binary outcomes, such as the logit link function. The authors propose a rank-
constrained likelihood-based estimation for Θ under the constraints that Θ admits a
rank-R CP decomposition, and that all the entries of Θ are bounded in absolute value
by a constant α ∈ R+. While these constraints render the problem non-convex, by
using a similar principle as in ALS, the optimization becomes convex for each block
of parameters while holding the others fixed.
One drawback of the techniques described above in the KPD setting is that
dimensions are assumed to stay fixed, or only grow temporally in the case of Zhou
et al. (2016), such that the addition and departure of vertices over time are not
handled adaptively. In this case, one needs to pre-allocate space in a large tensor in
order to model the augmenting network. Fibers of the tensor involving such a pair
will have entries of 0 until such time that the pair joins the network, which may
lead to issues in interpretation.
4.4 Alternative Methods to Model Temporal Kidney Paired Donation
We discuss here alternative methods to model temporal aspects of a KPD
program, outside of the tensor framework.
Xu (2015) proposes the stochastic block transition model (SBTM), which allows
the presence of a future edge in an evolving network to depend both on the current
network states and whether or not an edge is currently present, with vertices and
edges joining and departing the network as time progresses. Vertices can belong to
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one of a set of K classes, with c denoting the class membership vector such that ci = k
denotes that vertex i belongs to class k, where k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Note that vertices can
change class over time. The main idea behind the SBTM is as follows. Let W t and
ct represent an adjacency matrix and class membership vector at time t, with W (T )
and c(T ) denoting the sequence of adjacency matrices and class membership vectors
over a timespan of {1, . . . , T}. For any pair of vertices i and j, in classes a and b
respectively, that exist at both times t− 1 and t and with an edge between them at
time t− 1 (i.e. wt−1ij = 1), the wtij are independent and identically distributed. The
same is true if wt−1ij = 0. Thus, all edges, as well as non-edges, in a block at time
t − 1 are equally likely to re-appear at time t. Edges are formed according to two
block transition matrices: Πt|0 = [pit|0ab ], where pi
t|0
ab = P (w
t
ij = 1|wt−1ij = 0), denotes
the probability of a new edge forming within each block, and Πt|1 = [pit|1ab ], where
pi
t|1
ab = P (w
t
ij = 1|wt−1ij = 1) denotes the probability of existing edges re-occurring
within each block.
In this context, modeling the KPD as a SBTM would serve a similar means as
the tensor decomposition. The class memberships are analogous to the clusters from
the tensor decompositions in the previous section. These memberships are assigned
based on an approximate inference procedure using a combination of an extended
Kalman filter and a local search algorithm (Xu, 2015). Note that the ability to form
new matches among already observed pairs in a KPD would typically not be possible.
However, new compatibilities could arise, say, if one were to consider the possibility
of candidates seeking additional donors to join KPD with them over time, or other
situations such as desensitization (see Section 6.1.2).
KPD can also be described in the context of sequential decision-making. At
any given time, we have that the KPD program is in some state (e.g. a network
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of pairs and matches), at which point an action can be taken (e.g. proceed with
an exchange cycle), with a reward (e.g. successful transplants, realized utility) or
penalty (e.g. failed matches) observed. Approaches that model KPD via sequential
decision-making attempt to make the problem less myopic and more anticipatory.
Sequential decision making in KPD has commonly been applied to the problem
of NDD allocation. Li et al. (2014a) propose an approach to sequentially allocate
NDDs so as to maximize the expected utility over a given number of actions. Given
that a long pre-specified chain cannot commonly be implemented to completion in
practice, their model sees chains extended sequentially in a near-optimal manner by
selecting one potential transplant recipient at a time. Wang et al. (2017) extends
the idea by selecting chains of a set length using a look-ahead strategy, where the
value of each potential chain is assessed by taking account of the value of the bridge
donor to the future KPD pool.
Awasthi and Sandholm (2009) employ an online stochastic optimization algorithm
to kidney exchange, where subsets of the possible future trajectories of the KPD are
sampled and solved. Based on these trajectories, scores are assigned to each possible
exchange at the current time, and the set of such exchanges that produces the most
favorable score is selected. This approach is unique in the KPD literature in that
it attempts to anticipate the formation of future exchanges and adjusts allocation
policy based on these future trajectories.
4.5 Discussion
In this chapter, we address temporal aspects in KPD management. In
particular, we propose to employ tensor decomposition to uncover latent features in
a 3-dimensional representation of the progression of a KPD pool over time,
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characterizing the propensity of pairs to form matches. Other techniques to model
dynamic KPD programs are also outlined. Issues with tensor decomposition
procedures typically include selection of an appropriate number of components, and
avoiding sub-optimal decompositions in local minima. These can be addressed by
cross-validation and multiple initialization respectively. Future considerations
include adapting decomposition techniques for tensors that grow and shrink along
the compatibility modes, as pairs join and depart the underlying network.
Ultimately, clustering patterns or class assignments obtained as a result of these
techniques would be used to improve transplant allocation policy so as to account for
the transplantation windows for difficult-to-match pairs and preservation of matches
among them. The ethics involved in withholding pairs for transplantation represent
an important consideration for such procedures to be implemented. Ideally, consent




KPDGUI - Software for Management of Kidney Paired
Donation Programs
5.1 Introduction
We describe here our software application, KPDGUI (Kidney Paired Donation
Graphical User Interface), for optimization and management of a virtual KPD
program. KPDGUI provides users an interactive environment through which a pool
of incompatible donor-candidate pairs and NDDs can be visualized and customized,
with preferred exchanges identified through optimization. While there exist
software platforms for managing KPD programs, KPDGUI offers an interactive
visual display of the current state of the KPD program, and implementation of
optimization methods outlined in this dissertation.
5.2 Software Description
KPDGUI is written in C++, with the graphical user interface rendered using the
Qt framework (The Qt Company). Solutions to the IP problem (2.1) are obtained
using the linear programming software Gurobi 6.5.0 (Gurobi Optimization Inc.).
The application, code, example files and video tutorials can be accessed at https:
//github.com/mathieubray/KPDGUI.
67
Figure 5.1: Main KPDGUI screen displaying a KPD pool consisting of 8 pairs (including 2
candidates with two paired donors each), 1 NDD, and the matches among them
5.2.1 The Virtual Kidney Paired Donation Program
Launching the application displays the main screen, which is divided into two
panels (see Figure 5.1). On the left, the application visualizes the underlying
network representation of the KPD. On the right are a number of tabs which
contain information about the KPD, providing a running history of the commands
used during the current session and storing attributes of pairs and NDDs,
individual donors and candidates, matches, and cycles, chains, LRSs, and solutions
identified in previous match runs.
The user can add pairs or NDDs and their characteristics individually to populate
the KPD pool. Such characteristics include blood types and HLA information for
donors and candidates, along with other clinical characteristics, such as age, sex,
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Hepatitis C status for candidates, and cigarette smoking status for donors, among
others. The user can also specify failure probabilities for the donors and candidates
for calculations in optimization schemes involving fallback options. Alternatively,
one can load an entire set of pairs and NDDs from a structured file that contains the
required information for each pair and NDD. Note that more than one donor can be
associated with each candidate.
Once added, pairs and NDDs are displayed as elliptical nodes in the network.
Nodes representing pairs are displayed in red, while NDDs are displayed in purple.
If the candidate joins with more than one donor, each donor is represented by a
smaller blue node, grouped together with the candidate. Right-clicking an individual
donor or candidate in the visual panel gives the option to edit the characteristics of
the corresponding entity. In particular, the donor or candidate can be designated as
excluded from future match runs.
Matches are automatically generated for new pairs and NDDs based on virtual
crossmatches against all other pairs and NDDs already in the pool, comparing blood
types and HLA information. Matches are represented by arrows, which originate
from the donor and point to the matching candidate. If the virtual crossmatch
between a donor and candidate fails, no arrow is added. The user can assign a
custom transplant score to each match in the system, as well as change the failure
probability for calculation in optimization schemes involving fallback options. The
match can also be designated as excluded from future match runs.
5.2.2 Optimization
At any time, the user can trigger a match run, assessing the pool to find the
optimal selection of cycles and chains or LRSs. Prior to the match run, the user
specifies a number of parameters, in particular the optimization setting to employ,
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among those studied in Chapters II and III. We re-iterate these settings here:
1. Cycles and Chains: The optimal solution is the set of disjoint cycles and chains
that maximizes the total utility.
2. Cycles and Chains with Fallbacks: The optimal solution is the set of disjoint
cycles and chains that maximizes the total expected utility, accounting for
uncertainty and fallback options.
3. Locally Relevant Subgraphs: The optimal solution is the set of disjoint LRSs
that maximizes the total expected utility, accounting for uncertainty and
fallback options.
For each match run, the user provides upper bounds to the sizes of cycles and
chains to be considered. An upper bound to the size of the LRSs must also be
specified for the Locally Relevant Subgraphs setting, in which case the caps for
cycles and chains refer to the sub-cycles and sub-chains considered within each LRS.
The user also specifies the utility to assign to each individual match. The default
is a value of 1 for each match, representing the single potential transplant that can
result. Alternatively, the user-specified transplant score can be employed as the
utility. The estimated 5- or 10- year survival probability of the transplant, based
on output from the graft survival calculator by Ashby et al. (2017) using clinical
characteristics of the donor, candidate, and combination thereof provided by the
user, can also be employed as the utility (see section 6.1.1 for further commentary
on graft survival estimation).
Other parameters include the number of unique solutions to provide (in the sense
that while certain exchanges may appear in more than one solution, the combination
of selected exchanges will be different in each produced solution), and whether to
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estimate or calculate the expected utility exactly. If estimating, the user also specifies
the number of iterations to apply in the estimation procedure.
After a match run, each individual solution is added to the “Solutions” tab, and
the set of all cycles, chains, and LRSs within these solutions is added to the “Possible
Exchanges” tab. Selecting any of these will highlight the relevant matches in the
visual representation of the network, and double-clicking will bring up information
about the optimization settings used to generate the cycle, chain, LRS, or solution.
The user can also cluster and isolate any selected cycle, chain, LRS, or solution.
5.3 Example
We illustrate a typical use case of KPDGUI, applied to a synthetic KPD
program, obtained by sampling de-identified historical data from the Alliance for
Paired Donation. The virtual program consists of 107 donor-candidate pairs,
including 5 candidates with two incompatible donors and 1 candidate with three
such donors, and 11 NDDs.
We compare the results obtained through each of the three optimization settings.
A utility value of 1 is assumed for each match, and a 0.1 probability of non-viability
is assumed for each donor, candidate, and match involved. We allow a maximum
cycle size of 3 and a maximum chain length of 4. For LRSs, the maximum size is
capped at 5, with the maximum size of sub-cycles and length of sub-chains capped
at 3 and 4 respectively.
Figure 5.2 illustrates a representative solution under each optimization scheme.
The solution for Cycles and Chains is shown in Figure 5.2(a), consisting of cycles
of size 2 and 3 and chains of length 1 and 3 for a total of 9 transplants. Note that





Figure 5.2: KPDGUI solutions produced for a virtual KPD program under three optimization
settings: (a) Cycles and Chains, (b) Cycles and Chains with Fallbacks, (c) Locally Relevant
Subgraphs
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the best-case scenario, it is likely that donors or candidates will not be able to
proceed with transplantation despite their selection, or that presumed matches will
be overturned by results of a laboratory crossmatch. In either case, the cycle or chain
would have to be abandoned or shortened, respectively.
The solution for Cycles and Chains with Fallbacks is displayed in Figure 5.2(b),
with the expected utility calculation suggesting that one should expect 5.127
transplants (blind to possible fallback options in the previous setting, aside from
sub-chains up to the point of failure for the long chain, one would expect roughly
4.5 transplants). Here the chain from NDD 84 to pairs 103, 110, and 107 figures
prominently, with an expected 1.815 transplants after accounting for the possibility
of falling back to a sub-chain from NDD 84 to pairs 103 and 107, as well as the
potential sub-cycle between pairs 103 and 110.
The solution for the Locally Relevant Subgraph setting, displayed in Figure
5.2(c), groups pair 70 into the chain discussed above, which provides another
sub-chain option, increasing the expected number of transplants to 1.97. Another
tightly connected subgraph, involving pairs 46, 67, 106, 114, and 117, admits an
expected 2.143 transplants, based on the high number of sub-cycles within. The
optimal solution produces an expected 6.426 transplants. One may notice that,
while we have seen in the previous solution that pair 115 forms a cycle with pairs
114 and 106, this option is not included within a LRS in this solution. This is due
to the size constraints imposed on the LRS. The user can either address these
situations in an ad hoc manner, or rerun the optimization while allowing for larger




KPDGUI is a flexible tool for visualizing and managing KPD pools, performing
optimizations and offering decision support to KPD managers on possible exchanges
to pursue. We anticipate that the use of KPDGUI can help continue the adoption
and utilization of KPD in transplant centers in the United States and internationally.
We intend to include more streamlined uploading capabilities and further
customization and interactivity, based on feedback from clinical collaborators.
There are many policy considerations currently being explored in KPD that can be
implemented in subsequent versions of KPDGUI. Some of these policy
considerations are discussed in Chapter VI.
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CHAPTER VI
Summary and Future Work
6.1 Current Issues in Kidney Paired Donation
Several current realities in KPD have yet to be thoroughly explored in the
literature from a statistical or operations research standpoint. We briefly overview
some of these issues here. Areas of future study in KPD generally focus on
expanding the donor pool, addressing barriers to donation, and improving
outcomes for patients.
6.1.1 Expansion of Kidney Paired Donation Pools by Including Compatible Pairs
Transplant candidates with compatible living donors can elect to join a KPD
program, despite their ability to proceed directly to transplantation. Such pairs may
be motivated by the opportunity to find a superior match, for example via a younger
donor or a donor with a preferable HLA profile relative to the candidate (Gentry
et al., 2007; Mierzejewska et al., 2013; Ferrari et al., 2017; So¨nmez and U¨nver, 2017).
Involvement of compatible pairs enriches the KPD program not only through the
addition of donors, but also by potentially offsetting the deficiency of blood type O
donors often seen in KPD programs, as these donors are more commonly compatible
with their intended recipient. The concept of including compatible pairs in KPD has
appeared as early as Roth et al. (2005a).
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Convincing compatible pairs of the marginal benefit of participating in KPD
represents a major barrier to widespread adoption of this practice (So¨nmez and
U¨nver, 2017). To overcome this barrier, several studies have attempted to develop
tools to predict whether an alternative donor, say one participating in KPD, may
yield better post-transplant outcomes for a transplant candidate. Ashby et al.
(2017) estimate the expected 5- and 10-year graft survival via Cox regression, based
on a number of donor, candidate, and match characteristics. Similarly, Massie et al.
(2016) extend the Kidney Donor Profile Index, a measure of quality of a deceased
donor kidney, to be applicable for living donor kidneys. These estimates can be
valuable in the KPD setting to guide decisions for candidates with compatible
living donors who may benefit clinically by participating in a KPD program.
Future investigations may seek to model the inclusion of compatible pairs in
KPD, where candidates of compatible pairs match with donors expected to provide
a superior outcome to their current donors, as measured by the estimated graft
survival probabilities of the proposed transplants. Note that compatible pairs can
be included in KPDGUI, and we also implement the ability to use the estimated 5-
or 10- year graft survival by Ashby et al. (2017) as the utility assignment for
potential transplants.
Global Kidney Exchange (GKE) is another mechanism proposed to expand KPD
pools via the inclusion of foreign donor-candidate pairs who are unable to proceed
with transplantation in their home country due to financial barriers. Such pairs
would be invited to the United States to receive a kidney through an exchange with
a domestic pair, with all of the associated costs covered by an American institution
(Nikzad et al., 2017; Brunner et al., 2017; Rees et al., 2017). GKE is feasible when
the cost of dialysis in the developed world exceeds that of kidney transplantation
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by an amount greater than the medical costs involved in transplantation for a pair
from a developing-world country (Rees et al., 2017). Nikzad et al. (2017) claim
that it is possible to finance such transplants in a sustainable way from the savings
that arise from taking an American patient off of dialysis. It is further claimed that
implementing GKE would reduce the waiting time of domestic patients, as well as the
average dialysis cost per patient. The proposal has proven controversial, and there
are significant ethical and legal concerns to widespread adoption of the practice,
chief among these being the treatment, care and rights of the foreign living donors
(Wiseman and Gill, 2017; Baines and Jindal, 2017; Delmonico and Ascher, 2017;
Kute et al., 2017).
6.1.2 Transplantation of Incompatible Donor-Candidate Pairs
Outcomes for transplants among blood type incompatible pairs, through a
process referred to as desensitization, have become increasingly comparable to
those of blood type compatible transplants, in terms of both efficacy and safety
(Montgomery et al., 2012; Koo and Yang, 2015; Zschiedrich et al., 2016; Kauke
et al., 2016; Masutani et al., 2017). In addition, over the last decade, additional
desensitization techniques have made it possible for certain transplants to cross
HLA barriers where a compatible donor could not otherwise be found for a
transplant candidate (Gentry et al., 2011). These techniques attempt to eliminate
or reduce HLA antibody levels in transplant candidates to the point where a
successful laboratory crossmatch can be obtained (Pham et al., 2017).
In the KPD context, otherwise incompatible kidney transplantation made possible
via desensitization represents an important step in increasing the number of exchange
opportunities (Montgomery et al., 2011; Axelrod et al., 2017). However, protocols for
desensitization are resource intensive, and patients are at a higher risk of antibody-
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mediated rejection and may require more aggressive and costly therapies, meaning
desensitization should be reserved for only the most urgent or difficult-to-match
candidates (Axelrod et al., 2017). Balancing these objectives in KPD optimization
may be of interest for future investigations.
6.1.3 Advanced Donation
In KPD, transplant operations are typically conducted simultaneously, to avoid
the possibility of a donor reneging on their commitment after their paired candidate
has received their transplant. In some instances, a donor may wish to fulfill their
obligation prior to their candidate undergoing transplantation. For some potential
donors, time constraints represent an important factor in their decision to donate
(Flechner et al., 2015). In fact, the optimal time for some donors to donate may be
long before the intended recipient needs a transplant. For example, as presented in
Veale et al. (2017), a grandfather may wish to donate a kidney for the future benefit
of his grandson with chronic kidney disease. As such, certain accommodations can
be made for advanced donation, outside of the traditional restrictions set by KPD
programs.
Wall et al. (2017) identify three types of advanced donation. The first is referred to
as out-of-sequence donation, where a donor within an identified chain donates early
due to time constraints. Their paired candidate receives a kidney shortly thereafter
as the earlier section of the chain is completed. For a candidate whose paired donor
undergoes out-of-sequence donation, there is the risk that any of the donors in the
earlier section of the chain will not be able to proceed with their commitment, leaving
the candidate without a transplant and without their paired donor.
The second type of advanced donation is referred to as list exchange, a short-term
donation by a donor that occurs before their paired candidate has been matched.
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In list exchange, the donor provides a kidney to a candidate on the deceased donor
waitlist, with their paired candidate in return receiving future priority on the waitlist
(Gentry et al., 2005; Roth et al., 2006; Flechner et al., 2015). It has been suggested
that for small populations, more patients can be served by list exchange than KPD,
though the role of list exchange may be limited in larger populations due to ethical
concerns, namely the disadvantage to blood type O candidates on the deceased donor
waitlist (Gentry et al., 2005, 2011).
The third type of advanced donation is referred to as voucher donation, proposed
by Veale et al. (2017). In voucher donation, the donor donates a kidney and receives
a voucher for certain identified individuals who might require a kidney transplant
to be transplanted in the future. Donors in such a program act as NDDs, initiating
chains that do not include any of their listed candidates. In the future, when a listed
candidate redeems the voucher, the goal would be to end a chain of transplants with
the voucher candidate (Ross et al., 2017).
In both list exchange and voucher donation, there is no guarantee for how quickly
a kidney will be found for the candidate. In fact, a matched kidney may never
become available, or the program may cease to exist. On the other hand, individuals
listed in a voucher program may never require a kidney transplant, in which case
there is no ethical issue, with the donor simply acting as a NDD (Wall et al., 2017).
Ross et al. (2017) acknowledge a number of ethical and logistical issues that can
hinder development of a voucher program, most notably how to effectively prioritize
candidates redeeming their voucher. Modeling and simulation of voucher programs
may help illuminate this process, providing estimates of the benefit and risks to
candidates.
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6.1.4 Initiating Transplant Chains with Deceased Donor Kidneys
Melcher et al. (2016a) propose initiating transplant chains from deceased donor
kidneys, acting in an equivalent manner to NDDs. In practice, a deceased donor
kidney is offered to patients on the deceased donor waitlist according to a specified
order. Transplant centers can reject the offer, in which case the organ is extended
to the next patient according to precedence. If no offer is accepted during the viable
timeframe, roughly 36-48 hours after procurement, the organ is discarded. Under
this proposal, a deceased donor organ initiates a chain of transplants through a KPD
pool, with the final donor returning a transplant to the deceased donor waitlist.
Some ethical issues would need to be considered when initiating chains in KPD
using deceased donors. In particular, using deceased donor kidneys in such a manner
would need to be disclosed to KPD participants, as they are generally perceived to
be of poorer quality, and because the chains would need to be mobilized in a more
urgent manner than with living donors (Wall et al., 2017). Responding to Melcher
et al. (2016a), Kute et al. (2016) suggest that it may be unfair for certain easy-
to-match pairs to receive a deceased donor kidney in exchange for a living donor
kidney. Melcher et al. (2016b) reply that such chains may lead to more transplants
for difficult-to-match pairs, and that matching algorithms can incorporate exceptions
for certain situations. An interesting area of future research would be to determine
whether the gains in transplants realized through chains initiated by deceased donors
are offset by the lower number of blood type O donors returning to the waitlist,
candidates with low priority receiving transplants at the expense of candidates with
higher priority on the waitlist, and the possibility of KPD donors reneging on their
commitment.
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6.1.5 Cooperation between Kidney Paired Donation Programs
While most countries have a single national KPD registry, the United States has
several multi-center and single-center KPD programs operating concurrently. This
patchwork set-up leads to a number of issues. For example, disruption can occur
when a KPD pair enrolled in several KPD registries simultaneously matches in more
than one program (Melcher et al., 2013a).
A major issue in KPD in the United States stems from the differing incentives of
multi-center KPD programs and the individual transplant centers. While many such
centers are involved in larger networks of KPD programs, they may elect to withhold
their easy-to-match pairs or NDDs, matching internally in order to maximize the
number of its own patients who receive a kidney, and revealing only the more difficult-
to-match pairs to the collective (Ashlagi and Roth, 2012; Hajaj et al., 2015; Ashlagi
et al., 2015; Toulis and Parkes, 2015). Ashlagi and Roth (2014) summarize the issue
by claiming that current matching algorithms do not make it individually rational for
transplant centers to reveal all of their pairs. To discourage centers from withholding
pairs, it has been suggested to give priority to the most difficult-to-match pairs from
centers that have previously formed exchanges through the collective (Ashlagi and
Roth, 2012). Hajaj et al. (2015) suggest a mechanism wherein a center that reveals
a smaller number of pairs than should be expected at a given time is penalized with
a reduced probability that their revealed pairs are included in a collective solution
in the future. Further investigations into such strategies, as well as comparisons
between global and local KPD solutions, are warranted.
A natural solution to these issues would be the establishment of a national KPD
registry in the United States. Simulations by Segev et al. (2005b) suggest that
almost half of incompatible pairs could be matched through an optimized national
81
KPD program, which would provide a greater number and quality of matches than
the more regional programs operating currently.
6.1.6 Frequency of Match Runs
There is an intrinsic trade-off between the amount of time a KPD program should
wait before evaluating the pool for exchanges, and the number of pairs that can
be matched and exchanges that can be arranged. Though it may be costly to do
so, waiting for more pairs to accumulate in the pool before identifying potential
exchanges tends to increase the number of matches, especially in programs with
many highly-sensitized candidates (Ashlagi et al., 2013).
Recently in the United States, however, KPD programs have begun to perform
match runs at high frequency, possibly due to competition among programs as
described in Section 6.1.5, and recent work has also put into question the
conventional wisdom that time should be left between match runs (Ashlagi et al.,
2013; Anderson et al., 2015a; Ashlagi et al., 2018). There is some concern that such
frequent matching may lead to fewer overall transplants (Fumo et al., 2015).
Indeed, situations such as those investigated in Chapter IV, where matches
involving difficult-to-match pairs are lost as easy-to-match pairs form exchanges
quickly and depart, become more pronounced with more frequent match runs. It
appears that the question of optimal timing of match runs is unsettled, and can be
an interesting avenue for future investigation.
6.2 Summary
KPD is one of the most important areas for translational research in
transplantation, with the number of kidney transplants in the United States
arranged through KPD programs rising steadily every year (Organ Procurement
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and Transplantation Network). Successful expansion of kidney transplantation
through KPD has the potential to greatly improve the quality of life of recipients
and reduce costs, compared to continuing dialysis. Improvements to methods and
algorithms, expansion of existing allocation strategies and models, and the
introduction of new concepts to address current realities in KPD, all serve the goal
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